

Beyond Number Women's Representation in Taiwan's Post-Reform Legislative Elections

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Abstract

This study argues that electoral systems not only produce differences in the quantity but also in the quality of female representatives. It examines how the post-reform electoral systems in Taiwan recruit different types of women as candidates and representatives under the Single Member District (SMD) and the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems, the latter of which has a gender quota. In the data collected for this study, a dual-track pattern was identified for the current Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) rules. Namely, more electoral insiders are nominated and elected under the SMD system, whereas more outsiders are nominated and elected under the PR system with its gender quota. Insiders are persons with previous successful electoral experience; outsiders are persons lacking this background. Furthermore, the PR gender quota redefines the selection criteria for party nomination and expands the supply of female candidates overall. Taken together, the qualitative difference might account for the quantitative difference. Taiwan's female representatives reached the highest percentage recorded among Asian countries following the change in the electoral rules from the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)-Multiple-Member-District (MMD) system to the MMM system. In sum, this study demonstrates the differing effects of the changes to electoral systems on women's political representation in Taiwan, revealing the casual heterogeneity between electoral rules and women's participation in electoral politics.

Keywords: Dual-track pattern, female candidacy, list tier, MMM electoral systems, nominal tier, party nomination.

Taiwan has a higher percentage of female representatives in its national legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY), compared to most Asian countries. Many observers have attributed the high electability of women to Taiwan's special

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electoral rules and the reserved seats that had been adopted.¹ For a long time, Taiwan used the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) and Multiple-Member District (MMD) electoral systems and reserved for women approximately 10 percent of the seats at all levels of its representative bodies. However, in 2016, women held 38 percent of Taiwan's LY seats, a record high under the new electoral rules. After constitutional reform in 2005, Taiwan changed to the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system: 70 percent of the LY seats are elected by means of a Single Member District (SMD) system, and 30 percent are elected through Proportional Representation (PR). This raises several questions regarding the effects of Taiwan's electoral systems on the election of women to public office.

First, why did the percentage of women representatives increase after the change of electoral rules from the SNTV system to the MMM system? The old SNTV system is considered semi-PR, while the new MMM system tilts toward a plurality system (70 percent of the seats are returned through the SMD system). Comparative studies have repeatedly, if not conclusively, found that the PR system is more advantageous to the election of women than the plurality system.² As will be shown later, the percentage of women elected under the new SMD system, alone, has surpassed the number under the old SNTV system with its reserved seats. Why has the election of women in Taiwan not decreased under the SMD system which lacks a gender quota? Who are the women contesting under the SMD system? Are they different from women who are elected through PR?

Second, even if we take into account the new constitutional amendments, one of which requires a gender quota, the picture is still incomplete. The literature on the positive effect of gender quotas on increasing the successful election of women is quite extensive.³ The 2005 constitutional amendment in

¹ Bih-er Chou, Cal Clark, and Janet Clark, *Women in Taiwan Politics: Overcoming Barriers to Women's Participation in a Modernizing Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Chang-ling Huang, "Gender Quotas in Taiwan: The Impact of Global Diffusion," *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 1 (2015): 207-217; and Nathan F. Batto, "Was Taiwan's Electoral Reform Good for Women? SNTV, MMM, Gender Quotas, and Female Representation," *Issues & Studies* 50, no. 2 (2014): 39-76.

² Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Länder 1990–2000," *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 211-232; Miki Caul, "Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties," *Party Politics* 5, no. 1 (1999): 79-88; R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark, *Women, Elections, and Representation* (New York: Longman, 1994); Susan Welch and Donley T. Studlar, "Multi-member Districts and the Representation of Women: Evidence from Britain and the United States," *Journal of Politics* 52 (1990): 391-412; Wilma Rule, "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-three Democracies," *Western Political Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (1987): 477-498; and Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds., *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

³ Gregory D. Schmidt, "The Election of Women in List PR Systems: Testing the Conventional Wisdom," *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 2 (2009): 190-203; Louise K. Davidson-Schmich,

Taiwan requiring a gender quota stipulates that half of the PR party list must be women. But the PR list accounts for only 30 percent of the total number of seats. Taken together, the total number of seats reserved for women is about 15 percent (50 percent*30 percent) of the total number of LY seats. There is still a large gap between the electoral results of women gaining more than 30 percent of the seats in the post-reform elections and the reserved seats of 15 percent for women. How should we explain this incongruity between the electoral rules and the actual number of women elected as LY representatives in Taiwan?

This essay argues that the causal heterogeneity between electoral rules and the election of women requires the study to move beyond the numerical and mechanical comparison of representation by women under different electoral rules. Electoral systems produce differences not only in the quantity but also in the quality of women who run in legislative elections. Most importantly, the qualitative difference might account for the quantitative difference, a revised critical mass argument. One of the major explanations for women's underrepresentation emphasizes that the pool of qualified women from which candidates can be drawn is relatively small.⁴ This study will demonstrate that, after Taiwan's electoral reform, the gender quota in the list tier has redefined the selection criteria for party nomination and expanded the supply of women who are willing to serve as candidates overall. Different selection methods under different electoral rules result in a diversified pool of candidates, causing a changed landscape regarding the election of women as representatives.

More specifically, this study proposes dual-track hypotheses that the SMD system nominates and elects more electoral insiders, whereas PR with a gender quota nominates and elects more electoral outsiders. The current Mixed Member Majoritarian system is composed of two electoral approaches—SMDs and PR. The two approaches recruit and cultivate different types of women as candidates. Relatively speaking, the SMD system favors competitive candidates who are likely to be able to win one-on-one contests. Incumbents and locally elected office-holders who have good connections with their constituencies and broad name recognition are more likely to win,

"Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas: Evidence from the German Länder 1990–2000," *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 211-232; Mala N. Htun and Mark P. Jones, "Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-making: Electoral Quotas and Women's Leadership in Latin America," in *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Mark P. Jones, "Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women," *Comparative Political Studies* 31, no. 1 (1998): 3-21; Mark P. Jones, "Quota Legislation and the Election of Women: Learning from the Costa Rican Experience," *Journal of Politics* 66, no. 4 (2004): 1203-1223; Mona Lena Krook, "Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoptions," *European Political Science* 3, no. 3 (2004): 59-65; id., *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Netina Tan, "Introduction: Quotas and Non-quota Strategies in East Asia," *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 1 (2015): 171-217.

⁴ Darcy, Welch, and Clark, *Women, Elections, and Representation*.

whereas an outsider is more apt to be overwhelmed in an SMD election. The at-large PR election, which includes a gender quota, is less district-oriented, requires less personalized political competition, is more open, and recruits more outsiders than an SMD contest. The gender quota in the list tier further alters the established nomination processes of political parties. Compliance with the constitutional gender quota opens the electoral process to new faces of women as politicians. Electoral outsiders not only are accepted but also welcomed in the list tier, helping to expand the cohort of women who serve as representatives.

Given that only three legislative elections have taken place following electoral reform in Taiwan, no systematic investigation has been conducted of the effect of electoral rule changes on representation by women. This study first briefly reviews the effect of the electoral rule changes on representation by women, then focuses on how women have performed under the current electoral systems. It examines how the post-reform electoral SMD system and the PR system with its gender quota work in recruiting different types of women as candidates and representatives. In particular, this study demonstrates that the PR gender quota not only has increased the quantity of women representatives but also has changed the nature and quality of the electoral process. Under a different institutional context, a gender quota could have very different implications for the election of women as representatives.

Taiwan's Electoral Systems and Their Effect on Representation by Women

Like a natural experimental laboratory, Taiwan has adopted a varied set of electoral rules, including SNTV, MMM-SMD, and PR, combined with different types of gender quotas. Under the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang (KMT, or the Nationalist Party), the persons elected to the Legislative Yuan in mainland China in 1948 remained in office until 1990. In short, their first term lasted forty-two years. Because only a small percentage of elected seats was added after 1969, the LY used to be called “the Non-reelected Congress,” before a second round of elections finally was held in December 1992. The electoral system adopted for the 1992 election was primarily SNTV-MMD, combined with PR. Under the SNTV system, voters cast only one vote, but each district elected multiple members, with the top vote-getters winning seats. The PR seats, which did not function independently, were viewed as a by-product of the SNTV seats. Voters did not vote directly for at-large PR lists. Instead, the PR seats were allocated to all parties in proportion to the aggregate number of votes they obtained in all SNTV districts.

The political competition became increasingly intensified and volatile following Taiwan's democratization. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gradually became the primary opponent of the KMT in the Legislative Yuan and won the presidential election in 2000, 2004, and again in 2016. Partly due to the volatile political competitions, triggered by public discontent with the

chaotic national legislature, politicians from the two major parties—the KMT and the DPP—cooperated strategically to push for changes to the electoral rules, hoping to maximize their own number of LY seats and to marginalize splinter parties.⁵ After constitutional reform in 2005, Taiwan’s legislative electoral system was changed to Mixed Member Majoritarian rules, predominately a plurality system, with the 70 percent Single Member District system paralleling a 30 percent party-list system. Voters cast two votes in two electoral sectors—the nominal tier and the list tier—which function independently.

Taiwan also has implemented different types of gender quotas since the mid-twentieth century, which have changed in keeping with electoral reform. The 1947 constitution stipulated that there should be reserved seats for women at all levels of representative bodies.⁶ Later, as party competition intensified after Taiwan’s democratization, the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, adopted gender quotas in the late 1990s for their party nomination processes. At the end of the twentieth century, both parties required that one-fourth of the appointments to major party posts and for party nominations be reserved for women.⁷ After the reform of electoral rules in 2005, the old reserved-seat system and party quotas in the constituency, which no longer were applicable in the new SMD system, were removed and reapplied to the party list. As a result of pressure from women’s groups, a 2005 constitutional amendment (article 4, clause 2) stipulates that the number of women on each party’s list shall not be less than one-half the total number of listed candidates. This requirement was viewed as a measure to compensate for the expected loss of female candidacies that might be caused by the initiation of Single Member Districts. Accordingly, each of the two major parties changed its party quota by removing it from the nominal list and including it in the party list, with each party nominating women for half of the party list.⁸ Table 1 summarizes the changes in the electoral rules and gender quotas in Taiwan.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion on party competition and electoral reforms, see Jih-wen Lin, “The Politics of Reform in Japan and Taiwan,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006): 118-131.

⁶ The reserved seats system was applied in legislative elections under the SNTV system between 1992 and 2004. A district with at least five and less than ten seats had one reserved seat for a woman; additional seats were granted for every additional ten seats.

⁷ In 1996, the DPP included a one-fourth gender quota in its party nomination regulations. The KMT followed suit only after it was defeated in the 2000 election, at which point it also adopted a one-fourth gender quota for party nominations. For detailed discussions of Taiwan’s gender quotas, see Chang-ling Huang, “From Reserved Seats for Women to the Gender Quota System: Theory and Practice of Gender Parity in Politics,” *Issues and Studies* 40, no. 3 (2001): 69-82 (in Chinese), and id., “Gender Quotas in Taiwan.”

⁸ Generally speaking, gender quotas can be classified into three subtypes: reserved seat quotas, legislative candidate quotas, and party quotas. Both reserved and electoral candidate quotas are mandated in electoral or constitutional law and require compliance by all political parties. Party quotas are adopted voluntarily by individual political parties. In terms of influencing the electoral process, reserved seats regulate the final seat distributions by deciding who will be elected; by comparison, electoral candidate and party quotas regulate earlier stages of the electoral process

Table 1. Electoral Rules and Gender Quotas in Taiwan, 1992–Present

	1992–2004	2005–Present
Total number of seats	164 to 225 seats (changed in 1998)	113 seats
Ballot structure	One single ballot Nominal tier	Two ballots Nominal tier + party tier
Constituency / Nominal tier	SNTV (Single Non- Transferable Vote)	73 SMDs (Single Member Districts) +6 aboriginal representatives
Party list	No independent PR votes. PR seats were distributed according to their vote share in the SNTV election. ^a	34 PR (Proportional Representation) Seats Threshold: 5%
Gender quotas	Constitutionally reserved seats (about 10%). ^b Party nomination quotas	Constitutional candidate quota: Parity (50%) in the party list

Source: Compiled by the author.

Note: (a) Forty-one national at-large representatives and eight overseas Chinese representatives who were assigned through a party list offered by each party, based on party votes received in the SNTV system. (b) For every district that had a magnitude of more than five but less than ten, one seat was reserved; for every ten additional seats, one seat was reserved.

Table 2. Women Elected to the Legislative Yuan from 1992 to 2016

Election Year	Nominal tier		List tier		Total	
	Female (All seats)	%	Female (All seats)	%	Female (All seats)	%
1992	12 (125)	9.60	5 (30)	16.60	17 (161)	10.56
1995	18 (122)	14.75	4 (30)	13.33	23 (164)	14.02
1998	34 (168)	20.24	7 (41)	17.07	43 (225)	19.11
2001	37 (168)	22.02	8 (41)	19.51	50 (225)	22.22
2004	30 (168)	17.86	13 (41)	31.71	47 (225)	20.89
2008	16 (73)	21.92	17 (34)	50.00	34 (113)	30.08
2012	19 (73)	26.03	18 (34)	52.94	38 (113)	33.63
2016	23 (73)	31.51	18 (34)	52.94	43 (113)	38.05

Source: Taiwan’s Electoral Central Commission.

Note: The total number of seats includes overseas representatives and aboriginal representatives.

The gray area highlights the elections after the 2005 electoral reform.

in the selection of candidates. In Taiwan’s case, before the 2005 electoral reform, there were reserved seats and party gender quotas for the SNTV legislative elections. After the electoral reform, the gender quotas were changed to electoral candidate quotas, codified in the constitution. This study refers to the post-reform gender quota as the “PR gender quota,” or “gender quota in the party list,” interchangeably, to differentiate it from a party quota. More complete definitions of quotas and explanations of their differences can be seen in Drude Dahlerup, “Electoral Gender Quotas: Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result,” *Representation* 43, no. 2 (2007): 73-92; Jennifer Rosen, “Gender Quotas for Women in National Politics: A Comparative Analysis across Development Thresholds,” *Social Science Research* 66 (2017): 82-101; and Krook, *Quotas for Women in Politics*.

What are the effects of the electoral reform on women running for legislative office in Taiwan? Table 2 indicates a growing trend of representation by women after the electoral rules changed from a semi-PR—SNTV system to the Mixed Member Majoritarian system, which is predominately a plurality system. Before the 2005 electoral reform, the total percentage of women in Taiwan’s LY (including women elected by means of both the nominal and the list systems) on average was below 20 percent, except for 22.22 percent in 2001 and 20.89 percent in 2004. After the change in the electoral rules, the percentage on average has been over 30 percent: 30.08 percent in 2008, 33.63 percent in 2012, and 38.05 percent in 2016. If we separate the total number of elected women by the nominal tier and the party-list tier, the increasing trend of representation by women is reflected in both tiers.

In the nominal tier, it is generally assumed that the old SNTV—MMD system, due to its multimember nature and gender quota, might advance the election of women compared to the new SMD plurality system. Studies of state legislatures in the United States have suggested that higher percentages of women are elected in multimember districts (MMDs) than in single-member districts (SMDs).⁹ SNTV is considered a semi-proportional system in terms of its seats—votes proportionality.¹⁰ Unlike the PR system, under which the party constructs the name list and allocates the votes to its candidates, in the SNTV system, the individuals who receive the most votes win. But the SNTV system also differentiates itself from the plurality system, under which the winner takes all, and minorities run a higher risk of losing in a district. The SNTV system is not a zero-sum game in terms of party nomination in multimember districts. Therefore, although the SNTV system can be viewed as less attractive than pure Proportional Representation, it appears preferable to the plurality system. By contrast, the reasons that the SMD system does not favor women can be explained from the perspectives of political parties, voters, and candidates. From the party’s perspective, because only one candidate will be elected in an SMD, parties tend to nominate the candidate who is considered most competitive and has strong attachments to constituencies. Men with greater network connections and resources are considered to have higher levels of constituency attachment. From the perspective of voters, they may be more comfortable voting for women as part of a slate of candidates in a multimember district than as their sole representative in an SMD contest. In the MMD case, parties may be more willing to nominate female candidates. From the candidates’ perspective, a multimember district system can lower the

⁹ Richard E. Matland and Deborah D. Brown, “District Magnitude’s Effect on Female Representation in U. S. State Legislatures,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17 (1992): 469-492; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, *Women, Elections, and Representation*; Welch and Studlar, “Multi-member Districts and the Representation of Women”; and Wilma Rule, “Why More Women Are State Legislators: A Research Note,” *Western Political Quarterly* 43 (1990): 437-448.

¹⁰ Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

barriers for women, so they are more willing to stand for election.¹¹

Bearing the theoretical comparison of electoral rules in mind, Taiwan's electoral reform, in effect, should have turned the nominal elections from a positive-sum game under the multimember district system (SNTV—MMD) into a zero-sum game under the plurality system (SMD). However, contrary to expectation, the percentage of women elected under the new SMD plurality electoral system has surpassed the return of women to the legislature through the old SNTV electoral system. The percentages of women elected under the SMD system for the last three elections were 21.92 percent in 2008, 26.03 percent in 2012, and 31.51 percent in 2016, higher than the percentage returned under SNTV, which ranged from a low of 9.6 percent in 1992 to a high of 22.02 percent in 2001.

On the other hand, Proportional Representation plus its gender quota increased the number of female representatives as expected. Prior to Taiwan's electoral reform, PR was only a byproduct of SNTV, as voters did not vote for the party list. The percentage of women on the party list had been relatively low. After electoral reform, however, the percentage of women on the party list increased dramatically to an average of 50 percent, as a gender quota was mandated by constitutional amendment.

However, even with the increased number of female representatives, Nathan Batto contends that Taiwan's electoral reform in 2005 was detrimental to representation by women.¹² He argues that the old SNTV system with its gender quota promoted more women winning seats. By contrast, the new MMM system, with half of the list-tier seats reserved for women, could be regressive. Under the SNTV system, the party had to coordinate aspirants, estimate how many seats it could win in each district, and nominate the optimal number of candidates, accordingly. Political parties had to cultivate competent female candidates to win the reserved seats to prevent rival parties from capturing them. Batto argues that SNTV with reserved seats produced the desired results, without actually invoking the quota.¹³ In contrast, the new MMM system with the party-list gender quota might stigmatize women as ineffective candidates who require the protection of a quota. Batto also suggests that because the post-reform SMD system is not friendlier to women and the increase in the number of women winning seats is mainly from the party-list gender quota, which accounts for only 30 percent of the total number of seats, the system might decrease women's political representation in the long run.

With further examination, however, Batto's arguments are not supported. Judging from the initial experiences of the post-reform elections, the old

¹¹ Richard E. Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 737-755, and Darcy, Welch, and Clark, *Women, Elections, and Representation*.

¹² Batto, "Was Taiwan's Electoral Reform Good for Women?"

¹³ *Ibid.*, 62.

SNTV system, with its reserved seats, did not yield better representation of women in office compared to either the SMD system, without a gender quota, or PR with a gender quota. More must be explained as to why the SMD system without a gender quota, compared to the multimember SNTV system with reserved seats, has not decreased the representation of women in office as the literature expected. If the SNTV system with a gender quota cultivated capable female office-holders, who are the women who are recruited and elected under the SMD system? Furthermore, Batto's study neglects the fact that under the SNTV system, besides the constitutionally reserved seats, there was a gender quota for the two major parties after 1998 that required one-fourth of their candidates to be women. In a way, the party gender quota concurred with the function of the reserved-seat system. In large districts, parties had to recruit female candidates to meet the need for reserved seats, in which case the party normally invoked the party gender quota in the process of nomination. As a result, with very few exceptions, because of the interplay between the reserved seats and the party gender quota, female candidates generally won their seats without implementing the reserved seats in larger districts because of the party gender quota initiated within the parties. In other words, the party candidate quota which introduced the deliberate practice of nominating women within the party was crucial, yet it has not been given due attention. In addition, the effect of the reserved seats could be overrated.

The real function of the new PR gender quota, generally perceived to be quite different from the old reserved seats under the SNTV system, has not yet been fully evaluated. Comparing the effects of different types of gender quotas, some studies have contended that reserved seats are cosmetic add-ons that do not change the regular nomination process, while a party candidate quota demands that a party adjusts its nominations to meet a legal target quota.¹⁴ Some studies even criticize reserved seats, for they might be used by the ruling party to maintain its patronage system and consolidate its power.¹⁵ By contrast, an electoral candidate quota requiring all political parties to nominate a minimum percentage of women in their lists of candidates intervenes at an earlier stage of the electoral process than a reserved seat quota.¹⁶ After the 2005 electoral reform, Taiwan's district reserved seats were removed and reassigned to the party-list gender quota. The constitutional amendment can be equated

¹⁴ Rosen, "Gender Quotas for Women in National Politics," and Pär Zetterberg, "The Dynamic Relationship between Gender Quotas and Political Institutions," *Politics & Gender* 9, no. 3 (2013): 316-321.

¹⁵ Aili Tripp, Dior Konate, and Colleen Lowe-Morna, "Sub-Saharan Africa: On the Fast Track to Women's Political Representation," in *Women, Quotas and Politics: Routledge Research in Comparative Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup (New York: Routledge, 2006), 112-137; Rosen, "Gender Quotas for Women in National Politics"; and Richard Matland, "Electoral Quotas: Frequency and Effectiveness," in *Women, Quotas and Politics: Routledge Research in Comparative Politics*, ed. Drude Dahlerup (New York: Routledge, 2006), 275-292.

¹⁶ Rosen, "Gender Quotas for Women in National Politics."

to an electoral candidate quota, for it directly requires that women are half of the nominees for the party list. The electoral candidate quota has revised the nomination process by inducing party gatekeepers to actively identify, screen, and recruit potential female candidates. This quota could introduce different types of female candidates into political contests.

In short, there is no simple explanation for the complicated and evolving relationship among electoral rules, gender quotas, and the representation of women in office. All three seem to be correlated, although they are not in total agreement. To make the daunting analysis manageable, the following discussion focuses on why the post-reform MMM system has been conducive to the representation of women in elected governance. To this end, the investigation compares the ways in which the SMD system without a gender quota and PR with a gender quota work in Taiwan regarding the representation of women running in legislative elections.

Dual-Track Women's Representation in Office in Post-Reform Taiwan

After the 2005 electoral reform, the gap between the number of female candidates in the nominal tier and the list tier was expected to enlarge due to the gender parity rule in the list tier. As shown in table 2, after electoral reform in 2005, the rate of elected women was consistently around 50 percent in PR contests, and the rate of elected women in the SMD contests ranged from 21 percent to 31 percent. Unsurprisingly, PR plus the gender quota indeed advance the representation of women in these political contests. However, the differences between the SMD and PR systems regarding the nomination of women concern not only the number of women but also the recruiting criteria. Electoral candidate quotas have changed the nomination strategies of major parties in their consideration of who are the most adequate candidates. Beyond the numerical differences, what are the backgrounds of the women who are participating as candidates in the MMM's SMD and PR contests? How has the gender quota changed the patterns of party nominations? And what are the electoral results of the new approach to party nominations?

The logic for winning that underlies the SMD and PR systems is quite different, therefore major parties have adjusted their nomination strategies to address the changed electoral rules. Electoral systems affect the nomination methods and candidate preferences of parties. As Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh explain it, the electoral liability in the eyes of the party selectors under the single-member competition might be needed for purposes of balance in multimember elections.¹⁷ For example, the minority that has difficulty in gaining support from the majority of voters in a single-member district is more likely to be included in the party list to broaden the party's appeal.

¹⁷ Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds., *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics* (London: Sage, 1988), 260.

In the nominal tier, the one-on-one competition of the SMD is both party-centered and candidate-centered. Since only one legislator is elected in each district, competition tends to be party-centered. And, to maximize the votes for their candidates in each district, parties nominate the candidates who are most capable of cultivating and mobilizing personal votes. Incumbents with existing personal networks and organizations, name recognition, and connection to the constituency tend to be the priority. Local representatives who can mobilize votes through their local roots and service to the constituency also are considered good candidates. Candidates with previous successful electoral experience in the districts are most likely to be nominated and to win the contests. The logic of winning in the SMD contest works to the benefit of the electoral insiders in a district.

Unlike the attempt to maximize votes for the individual candidates in single-member districts, the goal of political parties in the PR system is to maximize their party votes through the list tier. Nomination decisions in the PR system are reached in an aggregate manner rather than district-by-district as in the SMD system. Parties weigh the value of candidates by their abilities to enhance party image and their vote-getting appeal overall. Most of the time, this produces a balanced party list and better representation of women on the ballot. The gender parity rule for the party list mandates that parties nominate women on an equal footing. Comparative studies suggest that the lack of an institutionalized party system leads to the dominance of informal networks of male elites, patriarchy, patronage, and clientelism in candidate recruitment. The mandatory gender quota in the PR system provides an institutionalized mechanism that enables women to break into the inner circle of party power.¹⁸ It alters the preferences and strategies of party nomination and provides more leverage to political parties to break the traditional circle of power that has prevailed in the nominal tier. Incumbents or insiders, favored by the SMDs, could detract from a party's image. By contrast, the new faces and electoral outsiders on a party list may sharpen the party preference of voters.

Based on these assumptions, this study proposes dual-track hypotheses:

H1. Under the SMD system, political parties nominate more electoral insiders, whereas, under the PR system with a gender quota, political parties nominate more electoral outsiders. The insiders are candidates with previous successful electoral

¹⁸ Julie Ballington and Richard E. Matland, "Political Parties and Special Measures: Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes," paper presented at the conference, Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes in Post-Conflict Countries, Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) & Department of Political Affairs Expert Group Meeting, January 19–22, 2004, Glen Cove, New York, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/meetings/2004/EGMelectoral/EP8-BallingtonMatland.PDF> (accessed November 13, 2018).

experience; outsiders lack this background. The gender quota for women goes beyond a purely mechanical function, as it invites political aliens into political contests. In the end, recruiting more electoral outsiders under the PR system can contribute to an increase of women representatives overall.

H2. The insider vs. outsider logic is even more pronounced in the general election than in the party nomination process. The logic for winning that underpins the different electoral systems dominates the general election. In the SMD contests, electoral insiders, incumbents, and local representatives should be favored by political parties in candidate selection because they have greater possibilities of winning than candidates who lack this background. But first they must overcome intraparty competition in the nomination process, especially when the districts are party strongholds. Once they are nominated by political parties, their likelihood of winning the general election increases. Likewise, the advantages of electoral outsiders in the PR contests should be more evident in the results of the general election than in the party nomination process. Party-list competitions emphasize party image overall. To boost and diversify party image, parties might prefer to present new faces with broad social representation in the visible and winnable seats of the party list.

To test these hypotheses, the next two sections examine the nomination processes and election results under the SMD and PR systems. The profiles of the candidates and elected members in the two tiers are given special examination. This study collects and compiles the political backgrounds of the nominees and elected legislators of the two major political parties—the KMT and the DPP—as these two parties hold over 90 percent of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. In contrast, the success rates for candidates of smaller parties have been very low. Based on the dual-track hypotheses, insiders are defined as persons with previous electoral experience, while outsiders are defined as persons lacking this background. This study codes prior political experience by four categories: (1) incumbents; (2) former representatives (served as legislators previously but did not serve during the last term); (3) local representatives (elected councilors or executives); and (4) new faces (never elected to either local or central representative bodies).¹⁹ The first three

¹⁹ Note that the first three categories are not mutually exclusive; some of the nominees served on local councils before they served in the legislature. The categorical division is to identify where they are from and their previous elected experience.

categories are further classified as the so-called insiders of electoral politics, while the last category is referenced as electoral outsiders. In addition, general information is discussed below regarding the strategies and actual practices of party nominations following electoral reform in 2005. These data have been collected by the author from various secondary sources, including past studies and news reports.

Party Nominations under the SMD and PR Systems

The effect of the change of the electoral rules on representation by women starts from the early stage of party nomination. A particularly important intervention in the nomination stage is the 2005 electoral quota mandating the inclusion of women in the PR candidate list. Political parties usually adjust their nomination strategies to electoral rules and reforms, accordingly. As different electoral rules prefer different types of candidates, political parties react strategically and nominate people who are more likely to win under certain electoral requirements. Different methods of selecting candidates not only determine how people are elected but also have strong implications for the types of candidates who ultimately are nominated. The long-term dataset on Taiwan's party nominations compiled by the author shows that Taiwan's party nomination processes do not function in a particularly institutionalized way, as they change from time to time and simultaneously incorporate different elements. Following electoral reform, there appears to have been a learning process during which major parties adjusted their nomination strategies to enhance their electoral performance. The nomination methods adopted after reform were quite different in the nominal and the list tiers.

In the nominal tier, the percentage of female candidates nominated by each of the two major parties increased after the 2005 electoral reform. Under the old SNTV system, Taiwan's main political parties had increased inclusiveness and decentralization, and engaged in less mediation through local factions, but there was not a consistent direction.²⁰ Under the new SMD system, given the downsizing of the legislature and the allotment of only one seat to each district, nominations became more critical. Some analysts argue that changing the nominal elections from the SNTV to the SMD system has made parties more dependent on surveys in choosing candidates.²¹ In SMD elections, polls are

²⁰ Chung-li Wu and Dafydd Fell, "Taiwan's Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (2001): 23-45; Dafydd Fell, "Democratization of Candidate Selection in Taiwanese Political Parties," *Journal of Electoral Studies* 13, no. 2 (2006): 167-198; and id., "Impact of Candidate Selection Systems on Election Results: Evidence from Taiwan before and after the Change in Electoral Systems," *China Quarterly* 213, no. 1 (2013): 152-171.

²¹ Ching-Hsin Yu, Eric Chen-Hua Yu, and Kaori Shoji, "Innovations of Candidate Selection Methods: Polling Primary and Kobo under the New Electoral Rules in Taiwan and Japan," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 4 (2014): 635-659.

considered the most effective method to detect the electability of candidates and to solve intraparty conflicts. The two major parties publicly announced the increased use of polls after the changes in the electoral rules. Both the KMT and the DPP maintained a 70 percent survey mixed with a 30 percent member-voting nomination system in the 2008 legislative elections, and later adjusted the nomination process to a 100 percent survey system in 2012 and 2016.

However, in practice, the electoral rule changes increased the power of the party's leadership in selecting candidates in the majority of districts, with about 70 to 80 percent of the candidates of both parties being either directly appointed or recruited by the party's leadership.²² Intraparty competition for party nomination has intensified under the new SMD system,²³ which gives the central party more leverage in selecting candidates. Under the old SNTV system, the two major parties gradually delegated their candidate selection to party members or even to voters to lessen discontent among factions. Candidates had relied on intraparty factions as the bases on which to build their personal support. In the new SMD system, because competitions are both party-centered and candidate-centered, the influence of factions in party nominations has declined in the districts. The competitions in the SMDs have become more intense and imbalanced, with safe seats attracting many candidates and hopeless seats not drawing suitable ones.²⁴ The SMD system requires parties to select candidates from among the best-known competitors, many of whom are drawn from a pool of local officials or incumbents. The incumbents are more likely to be nominated directly by the party. However, parties find it hard to recruit viable candidates in some districts. In the 2008 legislative elections, the DPP classified as "difficult" some districts in which their candidates received less than 42.5 percent of the party-list vote; the party recruited candidates for these districts. Direct recruitment by the DPP seeks to avoid the lack of incentive for its candidates as well as possible manipulation by the KMT in identified difficult districts during the party primaries. The key factor differentiating nominating strategies under the SMD system has been whether the candidates are incumbents running in a safe district.

In the PR system, after electoral reform, the old reserved-seat system in the constituency, which was no longer applicable in the new single-member district, was removed and reapplied to the party list. In compliance with the 2005 constitutional amendment, both parties changed their nomination regulations to reserve one half of the party-list nominations for women. This party-list

²² Wan-Ying Yang, "Women's Under-nomination in Taiwan's Legislative Elections," paper presented at the Workshop on Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Party and Political Organizations, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, November 20, 2015.

²³ Sheng-Yuan Sheng, "Revisiting Constituency Service and Legislative Work of Taiwan's Legislators: A Comparison before and after the Reform of the Electoral System," *Soochow Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (2014): 65-116 (in Chinese).

²⁴ Fell, "Impact of Candidate Selection Systems on Election Results," 164-165.

stipulation makes a large difference in the list-tier nomination process, as it is directly conducive to increasing women's political representation owed to the improved centralization of the candidate selection process, which also is now rule-bound.

Partly due to the highly regulated nature in the PR contests, major parties have tended to follow a closed-door policy regarding nominations. Under the PR system, the centralized control over nominations makes it easier for parties to comply with the gender quota stipulations. The two major parties tend to adopt a top-down approach, forming a special committee to decide the party list and the rank order of candidates.²⁵ However, the composition of the selection committees of the two major parties is somehow different. The KMT selection committee has been composed of seven to thirteen members from all levels of the party membership, but its participants are mainly executive committee leaders. The DPP selection committee has had seven to nine members, but participation in the committee has not been limited to party members, in an attempt to reflect group representation and social diversity. From the 2008 to the 2016 elections, the DPP selection committees were comprised of members with diverse social group backgrounds, including a women's movement funder (a professor); a Presbyterian priest; a Hakka renowned writer; social-welfare group advocates; a Lions Club president (a doctor); and a judicial reform foundation president (a lawyer). The differences in the composition of the selection committees of the parties also have resulted in the social diversity of their party lists. Persons with better social representation and image are more likely to be nominated and placed at the top of the party list. For example, the DPP nominated a social-welfare group advocate as its number one candidate on the party list in the 2008 and 2012 elections. The majority of its nominees have different social group backgrounds.

Comparatively speaking, the DPP has tried to instill more social diversity than the KMT into its party list by broadening the social base of its selection committee. In an effort to diversify the party list, both parties have established term limits in their respective nomination regulations. The KMT instituted the principle that party-list members should serve for only one term, except those who make substantial contributions to the party. The DPP also has a term-limit rule that party-list members can be reelected only once. Both major parties share the understanding that diversity of party-list members representing the party image is in the public good, in general, and therefore that the list should not be monopolized as personal political capital. Consequently, incumbents and party establishments not only are not favored but also discouraged to some extent in major party-list nominations.

As shown, Taiwan's two major political parties have taken into account the different logics for winning campaigns under different electoral rules when

²⁵ The DPP added that two-thirds of the list would be decided by a survey and party primary, and one-third of the list would be determined by the party chair (this was not applicable in 2008).

deciding their nomination methods and criteria. A further question is who is nominated under these nomination methods? To test the insider-vs.-outsider hypothesis concerning party nominations, table 3 shows the prior election experiences of all male and female candidates in both SMD and PR contests. For SMD contests, incumbents and local representatives are favored by both parties in the process of party nomination. Among all nominees, incumbents account for about half or more. Among women, there has been a higher percentage of incumbents than among men over three terms: 77 percent in 2008, 53 percent in 2012, and 58 percent in 2016. Similar patterns are found in local election experiences. In the past three elections, over half of the female nominees had served previously as locally elected politicians. Novices without prior elected experience find it hard to enter the SMD contests, as they account for a small percentage of female candidates. Female novices seem to face a higher hurdle than male novices in attempting to enter the SMD district contests.

By contrast, the PR elections have a large percentage of outsiders as candidates, who have not had previous electoral experience in either local or legislative elections. Local politicians are the least favored category of party nominees on the PR ballots. Except in the 2008 election, the first after electoral reform, the percentage of novices has exceeded that of incumbents. This was true in both 2012 and 2016. There has been a rather high percentage of both male and female nominees in the PR contests who never had been elected to office in either local or central elections. This is particularly high for women: 38 percent had no previous elected position in 2008, 51 percent in 2012, and 77 percent in 2016. It is reasonable to infer that in the initial post-reform election in 2008, neither the KMT nor the DDP could find an alternative way

Table 3. Backgrounds of Party Nominees in the SMD and PR Contests, 2008–2016.

Election Year		SMD						PR					
		Among men		Among women		Among all		Among men		Among women		Among all	
2008 Seventh Election	Incumbents	85	72.65%	17	77.27%	102	73.38%	22	66.67%	15	44.12%	37	55.22%
	Former Rep.	7	5.98%	0	0.00%	7	5.04%	1	3.03%	6	17.65%	7	10.45%
	Local Rep.	62	52.99%	14	63.64%	76	54.68%	7	21.21%	4	11.76%	11	16.42%
	Never	7	5.98%	1	4.55%	8	5.76%	8	24.24%	13	38.24%	21	31.34%
	Total	117		22		139		33		34		67	
2012 Eighth Election	Incumbents	49	45.37%	17	53.13%	66	47.14%	8	23.53%	10	30.30%	18	26.87%
	Former Rep.	23	21.30%	1	3.13%	24	17.14%	9	26.47%	5	15.15%	14	20.90%
	Local Rep.	56	51.85%	21	65.63%	77	55.00%	7	20.59%	5	15.15%	12	17.91%
	Never	21	19.44%	4	12.50%	25	17.86%	16	47.06%	17	51.52%	33	49.25%
	Total	108		32		140		34		33		67	
2016 Ninth Election	Incumbents	47	47.96%	20	58.82%	67	50.76%	4	12.50%	5	14.29%	9	13.43%
	Former Rep.	6	6.12%	4	11.76%	10	7.58%	6	18.75%	1	2.86%	7	10.45%
	Local Rep.	58	59.18%	20	58.82%	78	59.09%	4	12.50%	3	8.57%	7	10.45%
	Never	15	15.31%	4	11.76%	19	14.39%	22	68.75%	27	77.14%	49	73.13%
	Total	98		34		132		32		35		67	

Source: Data collected and compiled by author.

Note: Local rep. is the abbreviation for local representatives, including elected experiences at all local levels.

to recruit suitable candidates for the parallel party list, but that gradually they learned to look beyond the party for candidates. An increasing trend of recruiting novices as candidates in the PR contests in fact has expanded the pool of elected women representatives.

Elected Members under the SMD and PR Systems

How have the candidates nominated by parties contested in general elections? Do the insider-vs.-outsider divides in nomination persist in the final electoral results? The electoral rules dictate different electoral competitions. In the SMD contest, an intensive one-on-one competition, parties nominate only one candidate who is believed most likely to win. Personal votes and local resources in each district are vital to electoral victory. Incumbents or local politicians clearly perform better under these circumstances. In the PR contests, interparty competition increases the appeal of parties to the general public because there is a diversified party list and compliance with quota regulations.

Table 4 shows that the profiles of the elected representatives are similar to those of the party nominees. This affirms the assumption that party nomination is critical in determining electoral results, as parties, in developing their nomination methods, already have taken into account the logic of winning that must comply with the different electoral rules. In the SMD contests, those who are elected are more likely to be incumbents and local representatives. Most of the elected women are incumbents: 75 percent in 2008, 73 percent in 2012, and 63 percent in 2016. Incumbency advantage is on average more prominent in the general election than in party nominations, with about three-fourths of the elected office holders in two elections being incumbents. A vast majority of the elected women have previously served in local elected offices, higher than the percentage of nominated women with this background. Insider advantage is even more pronounced when considering the percentage of novices; consistently less than 10 percent of elected officeholders never served in elected office.

Evaluating the effect of the SMD system on women running for election should take into account the influence of incumbency. Past studies have shown that under the SMD system, incumbency advantages can help or hinder women's electoral fortunes.²⁶ Some observers have argued that incumbency can be a barrier that limits women's entrance into politics.²⁷ An alternative

²⁶ Barbara Palmer and Dennis Simon, "When Women Run against Women: The Hidden Influence of Female Incumbents in Elections to the U. S. House of Representatives, 1956–2002," *Politics & Gender* 1, no. 1 (2005): 39-63; Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, "The Incumbency Disadvantage and Women's Election to Legislative Office," *Electoral Studies* 24, no. 2 (2005): 227-244; and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield and Magda Hinojosa, "Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender Bias in Elections? Evidence from Chile," *Political Research Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (2014): 837-850.

²⁷ Barbara Burrell, *A Woman's Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Barbara Palmer and Dennis Simon,

view suggests that once females become incumbents, they are as likely as men to be renominated and reelected.²⁸ In Taiwan's case, as the data suggest, more women incumbents can lead to a larger number of female candidacies and higher representation rates in the SMDs. The past practices of gender quotas in the legislative and local elections under the former SNTV system provided a large reserve pool of women incumbents. This insider experience inherited from the past has become a political asset to women who run for office under the SMD system.

In the PR system, the backgrounds of those elected indicate the ranking preferences of the two major political parties. Apart from complying with the PR gender quota by nominating women to half of the winnable seats, parties are free to determine what types of female candidates will be at the top of the list. In each election, political parties estimate the number of seats they can win based on their previous electoral performances and survey polls. The two major parties propose almost a full list of candidates (thirty-four seats in total). Many candidates on the list, however, are aware of the possibility of their being elected from their place in the rank order of candidates before the election. The news media reports the possible range of the number of seats that are available to each political party. Who on the PR list will be elected is highly predictable once the nomination lists are submitted.

The majority of those who were high in the rank ordering of the list and were elected did not have previous electoral experience—with the one exception of 2008. In the initial post-reform election of 2008, the major political parties were not ready for a parallel party-list vote, so they searched for candidates within their own circles (e.g., incumbents or former legislators). As it was the first election in which the total number of LY seats was cut in half, plenty of incumbents from the old SNTV system crowded the field. Therefore, the parties had to accommodate their demands. Over 80 percent of the incumbents and former legislators were reelected. After term limits were applied to the nominations of the two major parties, the advantages of

"The Political Glass Ceiling: Gender, Strategy, and Incumbency in U. S. House Elections, 1978–1998," *Women & Politics* 23, nos. 1-2 (2001): 59-78; Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Political Recruitment to the Australian Legislature: Toward an Explanation of Women's Electoral Disadvantages," *Western Political Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1991): 467-485; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, *Women, Elections, and Representation*; Susan Welch and Donley T. Studlar, "The Opportunity Structure for Women's Candidacies and Electability in Britain and the United States," *Political Research Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (1996): 861-874; Susan J. Carroll, *Women as Candidates in American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); and Wilma Rule, "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-three Democracies," *Western Political Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (1987): 477-498.

²⁸ Palmer and Simon, "The Political Glass Ceiling"; Richard A. Seltzer, Jody Newman, and Melissa V. Leighton, *Sex as a Political Variable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U. S. Elections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997); and Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa, "Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender Bias in Elections?"

incumbency gradually faded in subsequent elections. Besides this trend, local representatives also dwindled among those elected from the party list. New faces replaced incumbents and local politicians on the PR list.

Table 4. Backgrounds of Elected Legislators in the SMD and PR Elections, 2008–2016.

Election Year		SMD						PR					
		Among men		Among women		Among all		Among men		Among women		Among all	
2008 Seventh Election	Incumbents	46	85.19%	12	75.00%	58	82.86%	15	88.24%	12	70.59%	27	79.41%
	Former Rep.	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	11.76%	2	5.88%
	Local Rep.	26	48.15%	11	68.75%	37	52.86%	4	23.53%	3	17.65%	7	20.59%
	Never	3	5.56%	1	6.25%	4	5.71%	2	11.76%	3	17.65%	5	14.71%
	Total		54		16		70		17		17		34
2012 Eighth Election	Incumbents	34	65.38%	14	73.68%	48	67.61%	4	28.57%	7	46.67%	11	37.93%
	Former Rep.	6	11.54%	0	0.00%	6	8.45%	4	28.57%	1	6.67%	5	17.24%
	Local Rep.	30	57.69%	13	68.42%	43	60.56%	2	14.29%	1	6.67%	3	10.34%
	Never	6	11.54%	1	5.26%	7	9.86%	6	42.86%	7	46.67%	13	44.83%
	Total		52		19		71		14		15		29
2016 Ninth Election	Incumbents	30	63.83%	14	63.64%	44	63.77%	4	28.57%	4	26.67%	8	27.59%
	Former Rep.	3	6.38%	2	9.09%	5	7.25%	4	28.57%	1	6.67%	5	17.24%
	Local Rep.	27	57.45%	14	63.64%	41	59.42%	4	28.57%	1	6.67%	5	17.24%
	Never	6	12.77%	2	9.09%	8	11.59%	6	42.86%	10	66.67%	16	55.17%
	Total		47		22		69		14		15		29

If most of the elected members in the PR contests are new faces, where are they from and where will they go after leaving their PR posts? A more thorough investigation of the pre-election backgrounds and post-election positions of PR members provides information about the career trajectories of the so-called electoral outsiders. According to the data collected for this study, over 70 percent of the elected members under the PR system were involved with social groups before being elected. Most of them were members or served as board members of different kinds of social groups, some in welfare or environmental groups, and many in women’s groups. Social-group experience rather than electoral background is a valuable qualification for female candidates in party nominations and general elections. The PR gender quota helped to recruit more women, and more importantly, expanded the cohort of female legislators.

There are different evaluations of the effectiveness of the PR gender quota in enhancing the election of women. Batto argues that, in Taiwan, the “quota women” who did not directly contest in districts as they did under the SNTV system but instead were elected because of a party-list gender quota in the Mixed Member Majoritarian system, will not be able to wield political influence.²⁹ The PR gender quota might produce less competent female legislators and could be dangerous to women’s representation in the long term. By contrast, Ki-young Shin argues that in South Korea, the effect of the gender quota in the PR system is not limited to the realm of PR but can contribute to women’s

²⁹ Batto, “Was Taiwan’s Electoral Reform Good for Women?”

³⁰ Ki-young Shin, “Women’s Sustainable Representation and the Spillover Effect of Electoral Gender Quotas in South Korea,” *International Political Science Review* 35, no. 1 (2014): 80-92.

sustainable political representation in the parliament overall.³⁰ Gender quotas work in a way similar to incumbency advantages. Although Korean women who gain office through a PR quota requirement can serve only one term on the party list, many of them are nominated and reelected in the SMDs. A strong “spillover” of women incumbents from the PR to the SMD tier contributes to the stable increase in the number of women who are elected to the parliament.

It is still too early to be able to predict the future career paths of women who gain office by means of the PR quota requirement, as only three elections have been held since electoral reform in 2005. Given the term-limit rule for party nominations, most of the women who are nominated through the PR quota can serve for only one or two terms. For those women elected through the PR quota requirement in 2008 and 2012, the data show that, after they left their posts, some of them were appointed to ministerial positions (24 percent of the 2008 cohort, and 17 percent of the 2012 cohort), some were reelected for a second term in the PR contest (35 percent of the 2008 cohort, and 17 percent of the 2012 cohort), some were reelected in the SMDs (18 percent of the 2008 cohort, and 6 percent of the 2012 cohort), and some served as leaders of their respective parties (24 percent of the 2008 cohort, and 17 percent of the 2012 cohort). Although a few of them left the political arena, the majority still work in fields related to politics. On the surface, not many PR women “spillover” into the SMD tier. Compared to the old SNTV system, the increasing percentage of women who have participated in the new SMD system is not a direct result of the PR spillover effect. There remains a dual-track insider-vs.-outsider pattern for the SMD and the PR systems, respectively. But the meaning of “spillover effect” has been expanded, transforming PR women who used to be political outsiders into political insiders in a broad sense. The PR gender quota in some way serves as a springboard for women to develop their political careers. In so doing, the pool of professional political women is enlarged in the long term.

Table 5. Post-Elected Office Political Careers of PR List Members, 2008 and 2012

Election Year	Political Careers of PR Members								
	Women elected	Ministers		Reelected in PR		Reelected in SMD		Party leaders	
2008 Seventh Election	17	4	23.53%	6	35.29%	3	17.65%	4	23.53%
2012 Eighth Election	18	3	16.67%	3	16.67%	1	5.56%	3	16.67%
2016 Ninth Election	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Conclusions

The effect of electoral systems on the political representation of women is not only about number but also about changing the criteria for selection. In the SMD system, the selection criterion is straightforward: nomination and election of those persons who have the greatest possibilities of winning in the district. Incumbents and local politicians with well-established networks and

who provide special benefits to their constituencies are preferred for party nominations and in general elections. As women and men both inherited large pools of incumbents from past elections, the SMD system has not seemed to deter women from running for and winning elected office. Candidate-centered competitions privilege insiders. In the PR system, political parties tend to emphasize the diversity of the party list to broaden the appeal of the list to voters. The gender quota further reinforces this tendency. Selecting representatives from different social groups could boost party image and win party-based votes. The term-limit principles governing nominations that were adopted by the two major parties reveal the parties' intentions to renew their party images by renewing their lists. To achieve the ideals of diversity, social representation, and renovation, the party list with the gender quota has opened the door to electoral outsiders.

All the post-reform gender dynamics revealed in Taiwan's case have not, as yet, been taken up forthrightly in the existing literature. Comparative studies on the effect of electoral rules on women's political representation tend to focus on the number of, but not on the profiles of, the female candidates. A consensus almost has been reached regarding the "number" argument that the SMD system is more disadvantageous to women's election compared to other electoral formulas, whether the semi-proportional SNTV or the PR system. Taiwan constitutes a paradoxical case in that the percentage of elected women in the post-reform SMD tier has increased compared to the number of women who were elected in the pre-reform SNTV system. Due to the limit of space and the focus on the comparisons between the SMD and PR systems, this study does not provide a diachronic analysis of the profiles of female candidates in the nominal tier before and after the 2005 electoral reform. Instead, it argues that no single factor contributes to the increasing number of female representatives in Taiwan under the SMD system. Prior to the electoral reform, major parties experimented with different nomination methods and gradually directed their nomination processes to party members or voters, which produced greater uncertainties as to who would be nominated and elected. After the 2005 electoral reform, political parties centralized their nomination processes and increased the number of female candidates in the SMDs. Female political insiders who have accumulated electoral experience commensurate with the logic of winning a contest in an SMD have a good chance to be nominated and elected. The downsizing of the Legislative Yuan (thus, a smaller demand for candidates), a large reserve pool of female incumbents from past SNTV elections with a gender quota (thus, a bigger supply of prospective female candidates), and the changing nomination and winning strategies under the new electoral rules all have contributed to producing a higher percentage of female representatives under the SMD system. A series of qualitative features synchronized to account for the differing electoral results for women under different electoral rules. By delving into what types of women succeed in the SMD contests, this study adds qualitative layers to the quantitative relationship

between electoral rules and the representation of women in elective office.

If the SMD system serves to accommodate the growing pool of women who are elected insiders, the PR system serves to expand the political space for female political outsiders. It is still too early to judge whether recruiting outsiders in the PR system could have a substantive effect on the election of women in the long term. Batto's study of women's representation in elected positions in Taiwan argues that PR plus the gender quota might result in less competent women gaining seats in the legislature.³¹ This study does not directly refute his argument, as only three elections have taken place since the 2005 electoral reform. However, we find that the PR gender quota can act as a stepping stone toward establishing political careers for women who have not found other ways into politics. Women as political outsiders might find that PR with its gender quota could reverse the established practices of electoral politics. The political parties weigh candidates by different criteria and look for different faces. Once entering the arena, women who are elected as representatives through the PR system gain access to political socialization, accumulate political clout, and are promoted later to different positions. This redefines the meaning of the "spillover" effect, not in the direct sense of transferring female legislators from the PR system to the SMD system, but in the fact that their newly gained experience enlarges the pool of female political insiders. This experience expands the terrain of the electoral game for women into an uncharted field. When electoral politics are no longer dominated by political insiders, we can at least project that more opportunities will be available to women as a political minority and as outsiders.

³¹ Batto, "Was Taiwan's Electoral Reform Good for Women?"