

Violence and Mobilization Probing the Inverted U-Shaped Link between Protest and Terrorism

Luis De la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca

Abstract

Case studies have documented a solid link between protests and violence, although several mechanisms have been suggested to account for this relationship. Here, we test this connection and adjudicate between alternative mechanisms by using the tools of the large-N design. Our findings solidly support the existence of a positive relationship between mobilization and violence. Overall, we find that more popular mobilization encourages more violence, but this effect is stronger when the mobilizational wave is heading downward. This probes that low-intensity violence such as terrorism tends to spike when protests are in the waning side of the curve.

Keywords: Large-N study, mobilization, political violence, protest, terrorism.

Many violent conflicts are associated with previous episodes of mass mobilization and protest. The Troubles in Northern Ireland were predated by the mass protest of the Civil Rights Movement of the late 1960s, in which Catholics voiced their demand to end political and economic discrimination. The emergence of Hamas as a terrorist group in the early 1990s was linked to the popular mobilization of the first Intifada in 1987. The wave of student protest that engulfed many developed countries around 1968 was followed by the emergence of revolutionary terrorist groups in several European countries. Waves of social protest also anticipated the eruption of large-scale revolutionary movements in countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, or more recently, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine.

In this essay, we examine whether political violence is more likely in times of popular mobilization. We do not necessarily assume a causal, direct

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relationship between the two phenomena. Our point is not that mass protest always leads to violence. In fact, there are many instances in which mass protest movements adopted the tactics of civil resistance and violence was avoided.¹ Yet, we concur with the existing literature that violence is more likely in times of popular mobilization. Moreover, violence is particularly likely to emerge when protests are starting to decline in numbers. If we combine these two propositions, the general conjecture we test in this study is that violence tends to rise in the context of high mass protest, and within that context, when the levels of protest are declining.

Traditional large-N research on violence sheds little light on such dynamics, since the explanatory factors tend to be structural (population size, levels of development, economic growth, inequality, ethnic and religious fragmentation, political regime, executive constraints, and so on). This holds for a venerable tradition of studies on generic political violence,² as well as for studies on specific types of violence, such as civil wars³ and terrorism.⁴ These

¹ Maria Stephan and Erika Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 7-44.

² Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Mark I. Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1987): 266-297; Manus I. Mildarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 491-509; Edward Muller and Mitchell A. Selligson, "Inequality and Insurgency," *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 2 (1987): 425-451; Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (1990): 624-651; and Kurt Schock, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (1996): 98-133.

³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 4 (1998): 563-573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90; Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 508-535; Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 415-429; and Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 814-858.

⁴ Brian Burgoon, "On Welfare and Terror," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 2 (2006): 176-203; Michael Findley and Joseph Young, "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2011): 357-378; Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005): 278-297; Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 230-258; and James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (2006): 159-177.

studies have left little room for the incorporation of agency into the analysis, which is problematic because they usually rely on structural explanations and neglect the key role of social actors.

However, some studies are trying to find the link between social movements and violence. Some authors have focused on nationalist or self-determination movements,⁵ others on revolutionary ones.⁶ This work carefully examines the internal dynamics of protest movements as well as the radicalization process, which often are driven by an insufficient or excessive state reaction.

This essay aligns with recent attempts to gauge the effects of popular mobilizations regarding other variables, such as regime change. Using an empirical approach, Jan Teorell found a positive effect of demonstrations on democratization.⁷ We follow a similar line, employing a large-N design to analyze the relationship between mass protest and violence. Given that the quality of the data on violence and mobilization is not particularly reliable enough for a large comparison of cases, we have gathered as many data sources on violence and mobilization as possible. Moreover, we analyze violence at different levels of granularity. The point of this exercise is to obtain consistent results with different data sources and at different levels of granularity. The greater this consistency, the greater the confidence in the substantial findings will be, regardless of data quality. Regarding mobilization, we replicate every analysis (where feasible) with the two main cross-national datasets that contain data on mobilization: the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (WHPS) and Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. And we test the effect of mobilization among three types of domestic violence: generic violence, civil wars, and terrorism.

In section 2, we lay out the main hypotheses. In section 3, we present the data. Section 4 contains the analysis. We find that more popular mobilization encourages more violence, but this effect is stronger when the mobilizational wave is heading downward. In this sense, violence seems to substitute for a lower mobilization capacity. In section 5, we present a discussion and an extension to explore the effects of repression in the relationship between violence and mobilization.

⁵ Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Luis De la Calle, *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, "From Protest to Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements" (unpublished manuscript, 2004, Yale University).

⁶ Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, "Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966–1973," *European Journal of Political Research* 14, no. 6 (1986): 607–632; Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Elisabeth Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁷ Jan Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Theory and Hypotheses

In this section, we discuss a number of theories addressing the relationship between protest and violence. Our first hypothesis is that a positive association between mass protest and political violence exists. When mass protest increases, violence is more likely. Mass protest can be taken as a symptom of an underlying social or political conflict that is not being solved through institutional politics. Lack of institutional responsiveness increases the odds of violence, which evolves as the consequence of a conflict that is not addressed adequately by the political system.

We are aware that, in some cases, a protest movement may be violent from the very beginning, so that violence precedes mass mobilization. This holds for armed groups such as Spain's Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the 1960s or Peru's Shining Path in the late 1970s. Under these conditions, violence is supposed to activate a movement and mobilize apathetic groups. Our claim, however, is not about necessary and sufficient conditions, since mass protest is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of terrorism or violence, more generally. As our hypothesis is formulated, confirmation requires only that violence erupts more often in contexts of high mobilization than in contexts with little or no popular protest.

We propose three different mechanisms or causal paths through which protest may trigger violence. The first is state repression. If the state, rather than responding to popular demands, opts to repress the protest, a radicalization process that ends with the adoption of violent tactics may follow. Repression sometimes works, with the movement being crushed, but sometimes it backfires, with the conflict escalating into a stage of open violence. The effects of repression are not predetermined; many authors have tried to specify the conditions under which it produces each type of effect.⁸ The literature tends to consider that whether repression is targeted or indiscriminate is crucial in accounting for the escalation process,⁹ but some recent work also downgrades the relevance of this factor.¹⁰ We do not make specific assumptions about

⁸ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dixon, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 364-381; Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007): 1-23; Ronald A. Francisco, "The Relationship between Coercion and Violence: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 2 (1995): 263-282; Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362; and Jan Pierskalla, "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 1 (2010): 117-145.

⁹ De la Calle, *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe*; Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation?"

¹⁰ Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (2015): 222-238, and Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?"

the expected effect of repression. The fact that repression may radicalize a movement, leading some activists to support violent tactics, is sufficient to anticipate greater violence when there is mass protest than when there is not. In the final discussion, we explore the interactive effect of repression and protest on violence.

The second mechanism by which protest may generate violence, purposely or not, is through group conflict. Since mass protest is aimed at changing the status quo, those who want to avoid change because they find the status quo favorable to their interests may resort to protesting in an opposite direction. Sectarian or ideological violence may follow if the various communities clash with each other. In the context of civil wars, for example, Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug have claimed that “horizontal inequality” between groups is one of the main causes of civil conflict.¹¹ Insofar as mass protest tries to change the balance of power between groups, it may generate sectarian violence.

Finally, the third mechanism draws upon the internal dynamics in the cycle of protest, so that violence might follow endogenously from mass protest, even in the absence of repression or sectarian conflict.¹² This is the case when activists go through a process of radicalization that leads them to take the momentous step of carrying arms. When governments do not concede or their concessions only satisfy moderates within the movement but are rendered as insufficient by diehard militants, the latter have incentive to resort to violence to keep protests alive. This mechanism is related to the second hypothesis we want to test.

The second hypothesis specifies the conditions under which mass protest has a greater impact on the adoption of violence. We follow, here, the theory of Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, according to which radicals within a protest movement resort to violence when mobilization starts to wane.¹³ Radicals try to compensate for the loss of participants in the movement by using more spectacular tactics, including violence. At some point, radicals may split from the movement, creating an underground group that will engage in full terrorist violence. The Weather Underground, for instance, was created after the collapse of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) amid internal unrest driven by radicalization.¹⁴

Radical activists are more impatient than moderates, have a greater commitment to the cause, and hold higher personal stakes because of sunken

¹¹ Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances and Civil War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹² James De Nardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

¹³ Della Porta and Tarrow, “Unwanted Children.”

¹⁴ Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and Politics of Solidarity* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006).

costs related to a deeper involvement. For all of these reasons, they will find the adoption of violence less objectionable when their numbers are decreasing. They may consider that violence will revitalize the movement by forcing people to take sides in a context of greater polarization, or that violence will put extra pressure on the state. By contrast, where demonstrations increase in size, with new people joining the movement, violence is not necessary and may even be counterproductive for the dynamics of the protest.

The second hypothesis can be traced back to Doug McAdam.¹⁵ Della Porta and Tarrow¹⁶ and Tarrow¹⁷ elaborated on and confirmed the hypothesis in the Italian case: the issue of taking up arms, which led to the *anni di piombo* (years of lead), became salient when mass protest started to decline after the impressive mobilizations of the years 1968–1969. They found that the violence of the early underground groups (such as the *Brigatte Rosse*) and radical political organizations (such as *Potere Operaio* and *Lotta Continua*) was a consequence of declining levels of protest. Mark Beissinger found similar results in his study on the secessionist movements that emerged in the republics of the former Soviet Union: violence reached its maximum after a fall in demonstrations.¹⁸ Likewise, Ruud Koopmans confirmed this effect for Germany (between 1965 and 1989) and the Netherlands (1975–1989).¹⁹ More recently, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Paloma Aguilar detected the same pattern in the context of the Spanish transition to democracy: terrorist violence increased when the cycle of mobilization related to the end of dictatorship came to an end (right after the first democratic elections of June 1977).²⁰ Given this array of case studies finding a similar effect, we test the hypothesis more systematically in a large-N design.

In sum, we present a double conjecture. On the one hand, levels of mass protest are positively associated with levels of violence. On the other hand, variation in the levels of mass protest also influences the level of violence: when the rate of change of mass protest is negative, levels of violence should go up. To put it in more formal terms, the level of violence is a function of the level of mass protest and of the derivative of mass protest with regard to time. Whereas the first effect is expected to be positive, the second is expected to be negative.

¹⁵ Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (1983): 735-754.

¹⁶ Della Porta and Tarrow, “Unwanted Children.”

¹⁷ Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder*.

¹⁸ Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization*.

¹⁹ Ruud Koopmans, “The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989,” *American Sociological Review* 58, no. 5 (1993): 637-658.

²⁰ Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Paloma Aguilar, “Terrorist Violence and Popular Mobilization: The Case of Spanish Transition to Democracy,” *Politics & Society* 37, no. 3 (2009): 428-453.

Before going into the statistical analysis, it may be useful to provide some brief illustrations of how the two hypotheses and the related mechanisms work in specific real-world contexts. The three illustrations correspond to cases in which violence appeared in a context of declining mobilization, but in each case the mechanism was different.

The Palestinian first Intifada started in December 1987 in a rather spontaneous way. After four Palestinians in a refugee camp in Gaza were accidentally killed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), a general uprising occurred in the occupied territories. This consisted of a boycott of economic activity (refusing to work for Israeli firms, pay taxes, use IDs, and so on) and popular resistance with massive demonstrations, in which stone throwing and tire burning were frequent. Repression by Israel was harsh: 248 Palestinians were killed in 1988 by the IDF, 294 in 1989, and 103 in 1990.²¹ Repression, harder life conditions (the economy collapsed in the occupied territories), and fatigue led to a decline in mass protest participation during 1989 and 1990.²² By 1991, after the first Iraq war, the Intifada was exhausted.²³ The fall in numbers was accompanied by an increase in the use of violent tactics.²⁴ But, more importantly, Hamas was created at the very beginning of the Intifada and, in 1991—in the context of a decline in mobilizations—formed its military branch, the Izz al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. Hamas emerged as the most powerful terrorist group within the Palestinian side and substituted killings for mass protest. By 1992, after receiving training from Lebanon's Hizbullah, Hamas started to use car bombs and conduct suicide missions.²⁵

The Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in Northern Ireland started in the early 1960s to combat economic and political discrimination through institutional means, such as by sending letters, organizing meetings, and presenting petitions. Due to the lack of results, in 1968, the CRM opted for noninstitutional mass protest and tried to put more pressure on the system with marches and civil-resistance tactics. A defining event was the police repression in Derry during one of the first marches, on October 5, 1968, which was an eye-opening experience for many activists.²⁶ However, the fate of the CRM was not so much marked by

²¹ Ayreh Shalev, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 186.

²² Ruth M. Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004), 111, and Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 112.

²³ Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 37.

²⁴ Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion*, 125.

²⁵ Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 65.

²⁶ Lorenzo Bossi, "The Dynamics of Social Movements Development: Northern Ireland's Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s," *Mobilization* 11, no. 1 (2006): 90, and Graham Ellison and Greg Martin, "Policing, Collective Action and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign," *British Journal of Sociology* 51, no. 4 (2000): 690.

repression as by the subsequent reaction of the Unionist forces, which activated ethnic conflict. The first sectarian fights between Catholics and Protestants were in January 1969. An immediate consequence was that moderates were marginalized in the CRM or abandoned the movement. Communal violence became paramount, and the British government dispatched troops to impose order in August. At that point, armed groups replaced the mass movements.²⁷ In an analysis of deaths due to rioting and terrorism in the period 1969–1973, Kathleen Peroff and Christopher Hewitt showed clearly how most deaths (93.3 percent) were still due to rioting in 1969, with very little terrorism, whereas in the following year—in 1970, when the Provisional Irish Republican Army started to act—deaths in riots declined to 47.8 percent of the total, and in 1971, only 18.2 percent were due to rioting. By 1972, 95.6 percent of all killings corresponded to terrorist activity. Terrorist groups became the dominant actors in the triangular conflict between the two religious communities, on the one hand, and the Republicans against the British state, on the other.²⁸

Most developed countries witnessed student turmoil in 1968 and 1969. Students occupied universities and took to the streets to protest against the Vietnam War and capitalist exploitation, demanding an alternative social order. Around 1970, the number of mobilizations were falling. In several countries, revolutionary armed struggle followed. The literature on the period is quite explicit about the sequence. Japan and Germany were the two countries in which violence started earlier. In Germany, the Red Army Faction (RAF) justified the choice of armed struggle in 1971 by mentioning the collapse of protest: “the student movement fell apart when its typically student and petit bourgeois form of organization, ‘antiauthoritarianism,’ proved itself ill-suited to achieving its goals” (quoted by J. Smith and André Moncourt²⁹). Stefan Wisniewski, a member of the RAF, said: “We were influenced by the collapse of the ’68 revolt; we wanted to continue defending the very same anti-imperialist and social-revolutionary ideas, and we did not see in the horizon any recovery of the social movements.”³⁰ A similar pattern can be found in Japan.³¹ In Italy, violence increased in the early 1970s as a consequence of

²⁷ De la Calle, *Nationalist Violence*, chap. 5.

²⁸ Kathleen Peroff and Christopher Hewitt, “Rioting in Northern Ireland: The Effects of Different Policies,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 4 (1980): 596.

²⁹ J. Smith and André Moncourt, *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History*, vol. 1, *Projectiles for the People* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2009), 91.

³⁰ Stefan Wisniewski, *Wir waren so unheimlich consequent... Ein Gespräch zur Geschichte der RAF* [We were so incredibly consequent... A conversation about the history of the RAF] (Berlin: ID-Verlag, 1997), 26.

³¹ See Takemasa Ando, *Japan's New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society* (London: Routledge, 2014), chap. 3, and William R. Farrell, *Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 77.

declining mass protest,³² but the real explosion of lethal violence took place during 1978–1980, right after the collapse of the '77 Movement.³³

The three illustrations above confirm that violence emerged in a context of high mobilization while mobilization was declining. In each case, however, the mechanism behind the radicalization was slightly different. For the first Intifada, the evolution from popular rebellion to Hamas's terrorism was precipitated by Israel's harsh repression of Palestinian activists. For Northern Ireland, mass protest led to terrorist violence through sectarian conflict between Protestants and Catholics. For the wave of revolutionary terrorism in developed countries, the radicalization process was generated by the dynamics of the movement itself.

We test the two hypotheses next, namely that violence is more likely to emerge when mass protest is intense, and even more so if the cycle of protest has entered a phase of decay. In this context, the more radicalized activists see violence as a solution to the loss of support for protest.

Data

We created a country–year panel with variables from different datasets. The time frame of the analysis corresponds to the span of 1946–2009, although not all of the variables cover such a long period of time.

Mobilization and Violence

We used Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) to measure mobilization. This dataset incorporates two indicators of protest for the whole period (1946–2009): antigovernment demonstrations and general strikes. Although related, these two indicators have different rationales and their correlation is relatively modest ($r=0.25$). For this reason, we included the two indicators separately in the statistical models, rather than aggregating them into a generic proxy of protest. The CNTS does not provide estimations about the number of people attending these events. Its unique source is the *New York Times*. There are 4,261 demonstrations in the dataset, which is obviously a significant underestimate of actual figures.

We complemented the CNTS with the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (WHPS).³⁴ This dataset includes a smaller number of years

³² Della Porta and Tarrow, "Unwanted Children."


³³ Nanni Balestrini and Primo Moroni, *L'orda d'oro 1968–1977: La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e creativa, politica ed esistenziale* [The golden horde 1968–1977: The great revolutionary, creative, political and essential wave] (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2005), 577, and Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 383.

³⁴ Charles Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948–1982*, ICPSR07761-v2 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1986).

(1948–1982), but its coverage of demonstrations is more systematic, and the sources are more varied. We singled out three types of protests documented in the WHPS: political strikes, student strikes, and protest demonstrations—the latter conflating into a single category what in the WHPS are called protest demonstration, demonstration met by police violence, and demonstration into riot. There are 9,873 demonstrations—more than twice the number of the Banks dataset for a significantly shorter period.


The correlations between the CNTS and WHPS are high: 0.64 for demonstrations and 0.49 for political/general strikes, which gives us some reassurance about the validity of these data. Figure 1 shows the aggregate time series of the two sources regarding demonstrations. In the years in which the two series overlap, there seems to be a common trend: a growth in mobilization in the 1960s and a fall in the first half of the 1970s, followed by a recovery in the second half of that decade. In the longer CNTS, a slow decline since the 1980s becomes apparent.

Figure 1. CNTS and WHPS Yearly Series of Demonstrations



Regarding political violence, we used two general indicators, which we then complemented with more specific ones. Based on the CNTS, we aggregated four types of violence (assassinations, guerrilla warfare, riots, and revolutions) into a single category. In turn, based on the WHPS, the types of violence that we merged into a single indicator are the following: armed attacks, attacks by insurgents, assassinations, and riots. The correlation between the two sources is

Figure 2. CNTS and WHPS Yearly Series of Violent Events



lower, 0.36, which might indicate that the two datasets are measuring different dimensions of violence.

As in the case of demonstrations, the WHPS registers much more violence than the CNTS. There seems to be a final drop in violence paired with a modest hike in protest in the WHPS series. Other than that, both series ebb and flow in figure 2 without a clear pattern.

To complement the CNTS and WHPS’s rough approximations of violence, we included two additional indicators of civil war conflict. First, we used the Intra-State Wars v.4.0 dataset of the Correlates of War (COW) project. An intrastate war requires at least one thousand battle-related combatant fatalities in a twelve-month period. There are 230 conflicts that have met this condition since World War II. Second, we used the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).³⁵ Although this dataset is updated regularly, we used it from 1970 to 2008. As it has been argued, the GTD not only covers terrorist violence but also armed violence more generally (much civil war violence is included³⁶). Thus, we can

³⁵ For the introduction of the original dataset, see Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 2 (2007): 181-204; for a description of dataset updates, see Neil Bowie and Alex Schmid, “Databases on Terrorism,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, ed. Alex Schmid (London: Routledge, 2011), 294-340.

³⁶ Luis De la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without Territory: An Analysis of Nonterritorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 4 (2012): 580-603.

use the GTD as a source for all intrastate armed conflict, but we also can try to separate civil war conflicts from terrorist conflicts or, less controversially, between territorial and nonterritorial conflicts (territorial conflicts are those in which the rebels hold control of some portion of the territory within a country's borders, whereas nonterritorial ones are those in which the rebels are underground).

Controls

As violence and mobilization depend on other factors that the literature has identified, we introduced several controls, when possible. First, we controlled for economic development (the log of GDP per capita, taken from the CNTS). Second, we controlled for country population (in logs, taken from the CNTS). Economic development and population are perhaps the two more robust predictors of political violence. Third, we took regime type into account, for which we used the Polity IV index (from -10 to +10). Fourth, we controlled for economic growth (taken from the CNTS). Lastly, we also introduced three indicators of past political instability, all from Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland: the age of the existing regime, the number of past transitions to authoritarianism, and whether the country is experiencing a regime transition in a given year.³⁷

Analysis

Since the dependent variable is a count model (number of violent events in each country-year), we used negative binomial regression with country-clustered standard errors. To check the consistency of our results, we also applied logit regression models when using onset as the dependent variable.

Hypothesis 1: Violence and Level of Mobilization

We started with a general test of whether violence is more likely when there is more mobilization. First, we wanted to check, at the highest level of abstraction, whether the sign of the relationship was positive or negative. For levels of violence, we used data from the CNTS, WHPS, and GTD. Since 93 percent of all observations in the GTD, 66 percent of those in the CNTS, and 43 percent in the case of the WHPS have a value of zero violent incidents, we replicated the analysis with zero-inflated models, with no substantial changes. For simplicity, here, we report only the standard negative binomial regression models.

Table 1 contains six models with violence as the dependent variable. In models 1–2, the dependent variable (violent events) comes from the WHPS

³⁷ Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *Public Choice* 143, nos. 1–2 (2010): 67–101.

Table 1. Number of Violent Events and Mobilization
Negative Binomial Estimates

	(1) WHPS	(2) WHPS	(3) CNTS	(4) CNTS	(5) GTD	(6) GTD
Demonstrations WHPS	0.0744 (1.32)		0.0395 (1.63)		0.0763 (0.99)	
Political strikes WHPS	0.231* (2.56)		0.122** (2.67)		0.209 (1.50)	
Student strikes WHPS	-0.129 (-0.39)		-0.0522 (-0.78)		-0.0975 (-0.40)	
General strikes CNTS		0.613** (2.66)		0.221*** (4.41)		0.522*** (4.90)
Antigov. demonstrations. CNTS		0.130* (2.26)		0.191*** (6.95)		0.171** (2.63)
GPD per capita (logged)	-0.325*** (-3.49)	-0.214* (-2.08)	-0.296*** (-5.42)	-0.332*** (-7.77)	0.759** (3.27)	0.520** (3.28)
Population (logged)	0.161 (1.93)	0.266** (3.13)	0.205*** (4.00)	0.246*** (5.95)	0.0228 (0.11)	0.404* (2.45)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0413** (2.92)	0.0593*** (3.40)	0.0193* (1.96)	0.0224** (2.98)	-0.0211 (-0.50)	0.0135 (0.47)
Growth	-0.0002 (-1.94)	-0.0002** (-2.65)	-0.00001 (-0.25)	-0.00001 (-0.83)	0.00001 (0.17)	0.00003 (0.32)
Regime transition	1.291* (2.14)	1.157* (2.26)	0.580*** (3.89)	0.671*** (6.18)	1.185* (2.18)	0.571 (1.25)
# of transitions	0.216 (1.65)	0.231 (1.24)	0.289** (3.07)	0.208** (3.07)	-0.00258 (-0.01)	0.0845 (0.32)
Country longevity	-0.0539 (-0.64)	-0.0640 (-0.66)	0.144* (2.35)	0.186** (3.23)	1.250*** (4.21)	1.070*** (4.15)
Constant	1.711 (1.77)	0.378 (0.38)	-0.781 (-1.30)	-1.137* (-2.42)	-11.52*** (-4.80)	-12.60*** (-5.99)
L α	1.306*** (14.35)	1.446*** (14.57)	0.617*** (7.44)	0.660*** (8.78)	2.574*** (11.49)	2.818*** (13.89)
chi2	75.260	77.087	190.521	378.456	205.710	144.135
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	3103	3220	3339	6257	1647	4397

t statistics, calculated with country-clustered standard errors, in parentheses.

All independent variables are lagged one period.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

(period 1948–1982); in models 3–4, it comes from the CNTS (1946–2009); and in models 5–6, it comes from the GTD (1970–2007). The sample size of WHPS is about half that of CNTS. To avoid the idiosyncrasies of each dataset, we used the two sources for mobilization with each source for violence. Thus, models 1–2 have the WHPS measure of violence in the dependent variable, with the WHPS measure of mobilization in model 1 and the CNTS one in model 2. This removes the potential bias of a dataset that registers more violence and more mobilization in some countries and less in others, generating an artificial association between the two variables. On first sight, table 1 reveals that the relationship between protest and violence generally holds, regardless of the combination of datasets used to estimate the results. Thus, when the two datasets are mixed (CNTS violence with WHPS mobilization, WHPS violence with CNTS mobilization), the results are as strong as when they come from the same dataset.

There is interesting variation when we look at the different indicators of mobilization. Political strikes (as measured by WHPS), general strikes (as by CNTS), and antigovernment demonstrations (as measured by the CNTS) have a robust, positive effect on violence, no matter the source of the dependent variable. By contrast, neither student strikes nor demonstrations measured by the WHPS reached levels of significance. Overall, there is enough evidence to conclude that higher levels of mobilization are associated with higher levels of violence.

The controls worked as expected and fit many of the regular findings in the literature on political violence. Economic development has a systematic negative effect, except when we work with data on terrorism (GTD; more on this below): violence tends to be concentrated in less-developed countries. Population has a positive effect. Growth tends to reduce violence, but the effect is not systematic. The Polity IV index of democracy has a positive effect: more democracy leads to more violence (this is a common finding in terrorism studies³⁸). Older countries have less violence than younger ones, and past instability tends to provoke greater violence, although the effect is not robust.

The results of table 1 are based on dependent variables that measure the incidence of violence. We did not consider the nature of these incidents (for instance, whether they were driven by the same motivations). The datasets simply count the total number of violent events. However, this method is subject to several objections. Highly heterogeneous events might be merged under a generic category of violence, blurring the real connection with levels of mobilization. Besides, the amalgamation of different types of violence might conceal the dynamics of specific conflicts: if one conflict is in decline and another is growing, the total level of violence could remain constant, even if there is relevant internal variation. An alternative approach is to focus

³⁸ See Erika Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (2013): 355–378.

on violent conflict onsets rather than on incidents. Thus, we proceeded to investigate the relationship between the onset of these conflicts and the levels of mobilization. For conflicts, we employed two different sources. First, we used the COW Intra-state dataset. Second, we singled out conflicts in the GTD featuring underground armed organizations that killed at least ten people and lasted more than one year.³⁹ Whereas almost all of the COW civil wars correspond to territorial conflicts in which the insurgents held de facto control over some portion of the state's territory, we used the GTD to identify nonterritorial, clandestine groups. We identified 156 episodes of civil war onset since 1945 from COW and 34 episodes of nonterritorial conflict onset from GTD.

The effect of time becomes more relevant when working with conflict onsets rather than events, since conflict onset may be predated by longer waves of protest. Thus, in addition to the one-year lag of the two CNTS mobilization variables (strikes and antigovernment demonstrations), we generated additional indicators of mobilization by averaging the first two and the first three year-lags of these variables. Given the dichotomous nature of the onset variable, we estimated on our country-year panel logit models controlling for time effects through the introduction of cubic splines.

The results appear in table 2. When conflict onsets are the dependent variable, mobilization also has a clear positive effect, both for civil wars and for terrorist conflicts. Mobilization makes conflict more likely. However, there are also interesting differences. Thus, political strikes have a longer effect on civil war onset, with demonstrations having an impact only on the year before a conflict begins; in contrast, demonstrations have a longer impact on terrorism onset, with strikes contributing to escalation during the last year before the start of the conflict.

Regarding controls, it is important to justify why we introduce a squared term of GDP per capita for the GTD data: the expected relationship between civil war and development is not the same as that between terrorism and development. In the first case, the literature shows a negative relationship: the greater the economic development, the less likely civil war will be. In the second case, development by itself is not significant. Yet, this is because the actual relationship is concave.⁴⁰ Hence, we need to introduce a squared term for development. As can be seen in table 2, the squared term is negative

³⁹ See De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, "Rebels without Territory," for a more detailed explanation.

⁴⁰ Ibid. See also, Walter Enders and Gary A. Hoover, "The Nonlinear Relationship between Terrorism and Poverty," *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings* 102, no. 3 (2012): 267-272; Walter Enders, Gary A. Hoover, and Todd Sandler, "The Changing Nonlinear Relationship between Income and Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 2 (2016): 195-225; and Andreas Freytag, Jens J. Krüger, Daniel Meierrieks, and Friedrich Schneider, "The Origins of Terrorism: Cross-Country Estimates of Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism," *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (2011): S5-S16.

Table 2. Conflict Onset and Mobilization Logit Estimates

	(1) GTD	(2) GTD	(3) GTD	(4) COW	(5) COW	(6) COW
General strikes (n=1)	0.326* (2.46)			0.304** (2.87)		
General strikes (n=2)		0.353 (1.42)			0.339* (2.43)	
General strikes (n=3)			0.364 (1.27)			0.339* (2.36)
Antigov. demons. (n=1)	0.109** (2.62)			0.0792*** (3.29)		
Antigov. demons. (n=2)		0.123** (3.01)			0.0802* (2.18)	
Antigov. demons. (n=3)			0.156*** (3.37)			0.0673 (1.47)
GDP per capita	9.991** (2.65)	9.622** (2.59)	9.748* (2.55)	-0.616*** (-4.08)	-0.604*** (-3.92)	-0.592*** (-3.81)
Sq. GDP per capita	-0.570** (-2.60)	-0.547* (-2.52)	-0.554* (-2.48)			
Rough terrain	0.269 (1.26)	0.267 (1.24)	0.270 (1.27)	0.181* (2.03)	0.184* (2.03)	0.188* (2.07)
Population (logged)	0.594*** (3.49)	0.593*** (3.34)	0.583*** (3.30)	-0.0727 (-0.88)	-0.0652 (-0.79)	-0.0544 (-0.66)
Regime (Polity IV)	-0.0154 (-0.43)	-0.0226 (-0.57)	-0.0237 (-0.58)	-0.00752 (-0.37)	-0.00821 (-0.39)	-0.00749 (-0.36)
Growth	0.000124* (2.24)	0.000134* (2.23)	0.000181* (2.22)	-0.0000380 (-0.47)	-0.0000425 (-0.52)	-0.0000446 (-0.51)
Regime transition	-0.153 (-0.69)	-0.0991 (-0.50)	-0.0841 (-0.44)	-0.0389 (-0.32)	-0.0308 (-0.25)	-0.0250 (-0.20)
Country longevity	-0.00445 (-0.01)	-0.0265 (-0.09)	-0.118 (-0.39)	0.196 (1.17)	0.166 (0.98)	0.125 (0.71)
Cubic 1	-0.0001 (-0.73)	-0.00009 (-0.67)	-0.0001 (-0.70)	-0.00003 (-0.43)	-0.00003 (-0.42)	-0.00002 (-0.38)
Cubic 2	0.00005 (0.55)	0.0000413 (0.47)	0.0000406 (0.48)	0.00000468 (0.12)	0.00000413 (0.11)	0.00000263 (0.07)
Cubic 3	-0.00001 (-0.08)	0.000001 (0.04)	0.000001 (0.09)	0.000003 (0.35)	0.000003 (0.37)	0.000003 (0.42)
Peace years	-0.131 (-1.32)	-0.125 (-1.28)	-0.130 (-1.36)	-0.0685* (-2.07)	-0.0686* (-2.09)	-0.0679* (-2.07)
Constant	-53.01** (-3.20)	-51.56** (-3.15)	-51.65** (-3.08)	1.630 (1.21)	1.576 (1.14)	1.543 (1.11)
chi2	108.602	107.142	120.171	153.942	142.432	141.444
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	3604	3590	3565	4857	4821	4766
R2	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.14	0.14	0.13

t statistics, calculated with country-clustered standard errors, in parentheses.

All independent variables are lagged one year, except for mobilization variables (for which n stands for the number of lags that are averaged for the calculation of levels of mobilization).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

and significant, confirming the concave relationship between terrorism and economic development.

Therefore, the robust finding is that mobilization is positively associated with violence. This holds for both incidence and onset. The results are particularly strong for political strikes and antigovernment demonstrations.

Hypothesis 2: Violence and the Mobilization Trend

We then tested the second hypothesis, according to which violence should be more likely in the declining stage of the mobilization cycle. As we pointed out before, this hypothesis has been confirmed through case studies but, as far we know, never through a cross-national design.

We suggest the following test, based on the trend of mobilization. On the one hand, we controlled for the level of mobilization. On the other hand, we introduced the difference between previous levels of mobilization. We calculated the difference between the more recent observations and the more distant ones; thus, a positive value in the difference would imply that mobilization is growing, while a negative one would mean that mobilization is decreasing.

We calculated the trend in mobilization for various time spans. The minimum span is one year. In this case, for instance, we introduced the difference between the first and the second lags:

$$(\text{Protests}_{t-1} - \text{Protests}_{t-2})$$

This difference was introduced in the regression equation together with the first lag, Protests_{t-1} , so that we simultaneously checked the effect of the level of mobilization and the effect of the trend (the value of protest plus its rhythm of change).

Of course, one-year spans may have been too short to capture the effect we were interested in testing. Hence, we also considered longer periods, averaging several lags and calculating the difference according to this simple formula:

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \text{Protest}_{t-i}}{n} - \frac{\sum_{i=n+1}^{2n} \text{Protest}_{t-i}}{n}$$

In the models, we tried using the following specifications of the trend structure: $n=1$, $n=2$, $n=3$, and $n=5$. When, for instance, $n=3$, we calculated at t the difference between the average mobilization of the previous three years (years -1, -2, and -3) and the average mobilization of the next three years further in the past (years -4, -5, and -6). For the sake of brevity, we reported only the first two specifications here, $n=1$ and $n=2$.

The second hypothesis, therefore, establishes that the greater the value of the difference in protest (the more positive the trend is), the fewer events of antistate violence will be observed. In other words, we should observe less violence when mobilization is growing than when it is declining.

Table 3. The Effect of Protest on Political Violence (Selected Coefficients)

Independent variables		dependent variables							
		WHPS		CNTS			GTD		
		nf=1	n=2	n=1	n=2	n=1	n=2	n=1	n=2
Antigovernment demonstrations (CNTS)	level	0.23*	0.52*	0.26	0.31***	0.29***	0.43***		
	trend	-0.12	-0.35*	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.13**	-0.25***		
General strikes (CNTS)	level	0.81**	1.15***	0.43***	0.48***	1.03***	1.21***		
	trend	-0.28*	-0.40*	-0.15***	-0.13*	-0.47**	-0.34*		
Demonstrations (WHPS)	level	0.14*	0.15*	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.14		
	trend	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.07	-0.05		
Political strikes (WHPS)	level	0.42	0.50***	0.25	0.30***	0.43**	0.48**		
	trend	-0.16***	-0.20***	-0.09**	-0.11***	-0.23**	-0.19*		
Student strikes (WHPS)	level	0.28	0.59	0.25	0.24	0.32	0.46		
	trend	0.002	-0.43	-0.06	0.01	-0.09	-0.23		

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

† 'n' refers to the number of lags that are averaged for the calculation of both the level and the mobilization trend.

As in table 1, the dependent variables were drawn from three sources of violence (the CNTS, WHPS, and GTD). As for demonstrations, we also used different indicators of antigovernment demonstrations and general strikes (from the CNTS), as well as political strikes, student strikes, and protest demonstrations (from the WHPS). As this yielded a very large statistical output, table 3 collects the key coefficients, and tables A.1.1–A.1.5, included in the appendix, report the full models. All the analyses were negative binomial models.

Table 3 reads as follows: the columns include models for the three different measurements of the dependent variable (WHPS, CNTS, and GTD). For each measurement, we show two different specifications—one in which the trend is calculated with one-year duration lags and another with two-year duration lags ($n=1$ and $n=2$). Regarding the independent variables, we included our five indicators of protest (two from the CNTS and the remaining three from the WHPS), and for each of them, we reported the lagged level of the indicator (whose sign should be positive) and its lagged trend (whose sign should be negative).

The results show a remarkably homogeneous pattern: the first hypothesis is again confirmed (levels of protest are positively related to violence), and the coefficients for the mobilization trend present negative signs (regardless of span length), as expected, indicating that radical activists increasingly resort to violence when participation in a protest falters, or inversely, that radicals do not trigger violence when the protest movement is still growing.

The results also display some interesting variation, depending on the proxy we use for mobilization. The CNTS indicators of antigovernment demonstrations and general strikes show a consistent relationship between declining mobilization and increasing antistate violence. In contrast, the WHPS indicators offer a more nuanced picture. On the one hand, political strikes (from the WHPS) follow the same declining trend we found in the models with the CNTS indicators of mobilization. On the other hand, general demonstrations and student strikes do not have a noticeable impact on violence. The latter result is particularly puzzling, since there is extensive literature connecting student protests with radicalization and subsequent violence in countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United States.⁴¹ These, however, are all developed countries. We replicated the estimations after separating developed from nondeveloped countries (results not shown here): after doing so, student strikes had the expected sign and were significant, but only in developed countries. Perhaps student strikes are camouflaged within larger protest movements in nondeveloped countries, and this may conceal their effect on violence.

⁴¹ Among many others, Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., *Political Action: Mass Protest in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); McAdam, “Tactical Innovation”; Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder*; and Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2003).

Figure 3. The Effect of the Mobilization Trend on Violence
(model 8 in table A.1.2)




Figure 3 shows the effect of the trend of general strikes when all the other variables are kept at their means, including the lag of general strikes and their mobilization trend during the two previous years (model 8 in table A.1.2). The predicted rate of violence increases rapidly when the trend is negative. For positive values, the slope is flatter, indicating that strikes' waves—which are in the rise—rarely encourage antistate violence.

The analysis of table 3 confirms, by and large, the hypothesis that violence is more likely when levels of mobilization are declining. It provides cross-national support to a hypothesis that has been tested in only a few case studies. The general conclusion is that protest escalates into violence when the level of protest is decreasing.

Discussion

The missing element in the previous analysis on mobilization and violence is the state's reaction. The state may decide to repress protest, with uncertain results: repression sometimes works, with the movement being crushed, and sometimes backfires, with the conflict escalating into a stage of open violence.⁴² In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between protest and violence is mediated by state repression and, if so, in which direction.

We want to make two contributions. First, although we cannot distinguish between selective or indiscriminate repression, we can assess the general impact

⁴² On the role of state repression and protest dynamics, see Yongshun Cai, *Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

Table 4. Interactive Effect of Repression and Mobilization on Antistate Violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ciri index	0.280*** (9.14)	0.305*** (8.84)	0.281*** (9.14)	0.304*** (8.82)
Demonstrations (level)	0.213*** (7.42)		0.212*** (7.26)	
Demonstrations (trend)	-0.0522* (-2.11)		0.0629 (1.44)	
Ciri*demonst (trend)			-0.0250*** (-3.31)	
Strikes (level)		0.312*** (4.02)		0.309*** (3.99)
Strikes (trend)		-0.106* (-2.54)		-0.0354 (-0.28)
Ciri*Strikes (trend)				-0.0150 (-0.71)
GDP per capita	-0.180** (-2.93)	-0.121 (-1.62)	-0.183** (-2.99)	-0.121 (-1.63)
Population (logged)	0.195*** (3.48)	0.263*** (4.36)	0.198*** (3.58)	0.264*** (4.38)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0418*** (4.45)	0.0398*** (3.74)	0.0421*** (4.51)	0.0399*** (3.75)
Growth	-0.00002 (-1.19)	-0.00003 (-1.38)	-0.00002 (-1.16)	-0.00003 (-1.37)
Regime transition	0.337 (1.44)	0.571** (2.59)	0.355 (1.54)	0.571** (2.59)
# of transitions	0.123 (1.92)	0.0882 (1.17)	0.122 (1.93)	0.0882 (1.17)
Country longevity	0.116 (1.17)	0.0911 (0.81)	0.115 (1.15)	0.0914 (0.81)
Constant	-2.629*** (-4.40)	-3.521*** (-5.58)	-2.642*** (-4.47)	-3.528*** (-5.59)
Lalpha	0.384*** (3.52)	0.517*** (4.52)	0.372*** (3.38)	0.517*** (4.52)
chi2	425.345	406.719	447.661	419.822
P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2530	2530	2530	2530
Alpha	1.469	1.677	1.451	1.677

t statistics, calculated with country-standard errors, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All independent variables are lagged one year, except for the trend variables, which subtract the number of protests (strikes and demonstrations) in t_2 from the number in t_1 .

of repression on antistate violence. Second, we want to investigate whether the effect of protest on violence is mediated by repression. In the theoretical section, we mentioned that one of the mechanisms connecting the decline in protests with the increase in violence is the repressive intervention of the state. When security forces act against popular movements, this usually discourages moderates from demonstrating and prompts radicals to take a violent course. Do our data hold this interpretation? To check this, we included an interaction between repression and the indicators of mobilization in the models.

Table 4 shows the results. We used the CIRI physical integrity rights index as a way to capture the level of state repression in a country.⁴³ The dependent variable is Banks's CNTS violence. There are four models. The first two models included the lagged levels of CNTS demonstrations and CNTS strikes, and their respective trend terms for the previous two years, with the CIRI index as a control variable. The third and fourth models included an interaction term between repression and the trend terms for our key protest indicators. The control variables were lagged one year. The models are negative binomial.

To begin, the CIRI physical integrity rights index always showed a positive and significant effect, indicating that repression leads to greater violence in the next period. As found in table 3, the effects of demonstrations and strikes are again positive and significant. These results hold even if we control for state repression.


Models 3 and 4 looked at the interactions between state repression and the two-year trend terms for demonstrations and strikes. All the interaction coefficients bore negative coefficients, but only those corresponding to antigovernment demonstrations were significant. Thus, it seems that state repression infuriates protestors enough for them to turn to violence only when they are demonstrating but not striking. Strikers may have internalized the chance of facing repression and therefore their behavior is less affected by state reaction. In contrast, demonstrators may be more uncertain about state misbehavior and adopt more extreme preferences once the state reacts repressively.

As the interpretation of interactions with continuous variables is not obvious, we estimated the impact of the two-year demonstration trend on antistate violence for three levels of repression: high, intermediate, and low. Figure 4 plots the effect of the increase or decrease of antigovernment demonstrations over the previous two years on antistate violence resulting from different levels of repression.

We already have seen that decreasing mobilizational tides encourage violence. Interestingly, figure 4 reveals that most of the effect is driven by high-repression settings. In countries where the government resorts to harsh

⁴³ David Cingranelli and David Richards, *The Cingranelli–Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual* (Version 5.20.14) (2014), <http://www.humanrightsdata.com> (accessed June 12, 2020).

Figure 4. The Effect of Two-Year Demonstration Trend on Violence Conditional by State Repression (model 3 in table 4)



measures against regime opponents and demonstrators, shrinking protest movements largely turn into open, violent rebellions. In contrast, the effect is negligible in countries with lower levels of state repression. This finding proves the prototypical mobilizational cycle of peaceful protest—harsh repression—rebellion that we find in countries as diverse as Salvador, Italy, and Egypt. When the state is able to tie its hands and avoid overreacting, protests do not spill over into violence.

Conclusions

In this essay, we tried a new approach to studying social mobilization and political violence. Most large-N studies have neglected the role of social movements in analyzing antigovernment violence because of problems gathering data and the reliability of existing datasets. On the other hand, many case studies have documented a resilient link between protests and violence, showing that violence spikes when the wave of mobilization comes to an end. Here, we have tried to test this finding by using the tools of the large-N literature.

Our findings solidly support the existence of a positive relationship between mobilization and violence, even when controlling for state repression. However, we can be more precise: violence is particularly likely when the cycle of mobilization enters its downward phase. This confirms the argument made

in the literature on social movements and tested only in case studies.⁴⁴ These connections are stronger for specific forms of protest such as antigovernment demonstrations and political strikes (student strikes have an effect only in developed countries). If we focus on different types of violent conflict, civil wars seem to be anticipated by large strikes, whereas low-intensity conflicts, such as terrorist violence, are more connected to antigovernment demonstration cycles.

Finally, a more exploratory analysis has shown that repression tends to have a positive effect on violence when controlling for levels of mass protest and, more interestingly, that high levels of repression reinforce the effect of declining mobilization on violence.

We hope that this study opens the way for more systematic analyses of the relationship between protest and violence. So far, this has been the subject of purely formal theory or of qualitative case studies in the literature on social movements. Our goal was to establish a connection between this literature and large-N analyses of violence. Coverage biases and measurement problems notwithstanding, our combination of different indicators and cross-national datasets has shown that it is possible to find robust and substantive results.

⁴⁴ Della Porta and Tarrow, “Unwanted Children.”

Appendix

Table A.1.1 Mobilization Trend and Antistate Violence
Independent variable: antigovernment demonstrations (CNTS)

	(1) WHPS	(2) CNTS	(3) GTD	(4) WHPS	(5) CNTS	(6) GTD
One-year lag	0.230* (2.06)	0.264*** (5.56)	0.287*** (3.48)			
Two-year trend	-0.120 (-1.71)	-0.105*** (-3.64)	-0.129** (-3.11)			
Two-year average lag				0.524* (2.14)	0.310*** (5.12)	0.428*** (4.59)
Four-year trend				-0.351* (-2.43)	-0.0913** (-2.86)	-0.251*** (-3.38)
GDP per capita	-0.222* (-2.12)	-0.345*** (-8.16)	0.503** (3.17)	-0.229* (-2.26)	-0.359*** (-8.18)	0.475** (2.97)
Population (logged)	0.262** (2.84)	0.235*** (5.63)	0.422* (2.56)	0.213* (2.34)	0.226*** (5.38)	0.365* (2.25)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0686*** (3.45)	0.0238** (3.06)	0.0129 (0.43)	0.0659** (3.22)	0.0228** (2.88)	0.00637 (0.21)
Growth	-0.0002** (-2.81)	-0.00001 (-0.78)	0.00003 (0.29)	-0.0002** (-3.03)	-0.00002 (-1.04)	0.00002 (0.21)
Regime transition	1.048* (2.45)	0.655*** (5.64)	0.489 (1.08)	1.233* (2.31)	0.631*** (5.17)	0.537 (1.21)
# of transitions	0.207 (1.22)	0.231*** (3.50)	0.127 (0.49)	0.154 (0.96)	0.227*** (3.48)	0.101 (0.39)
Country longevity	0.00893 (0.08)	0.195** (3.19)	1.067*** (4.00)	-0.0311 (-0.27)	0.236*** (3.43)	1.122*** (3.99)
Constant	0.291 (0.26)	-1.002* (-2.05)	-12.60*** (-5.94)	0.779 (0.68)	-1.029* (-2.02)	-12.19*** (-5.78)
Inalpha						
Constant	1.468*** (13.83)	0.672*** (8.70)	2.831*** (13.80)	1.433*** (13.62)	0.684*** (8.61)	2.808*** (13.67)
chi2	70.619	307.384	129.396	61.163	294.444	124.092
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	3166	6115	4365	2948	5829	4282
alpha	4.341	1.957	16.962	4.190	1.982	16.584

t statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.1.2 Mobilization Trend and Antistate Violence
 Independent variable: general strikes (CNTS)

	(7) WHPS	(8) CNTS	(9) GTD	(10) WHPS	(11) CNTS	(12) GTD
One-year lag	0.810** (3.09)	0.428*** (5.33)	1.027*** (5.04)			
Two-year trend	-0.279* (-2.27)	-0.151*** (-4.32)	-0.470** (-3.28)			
Two-year average lag				1.154*** (3.46)	0.485*** (4.48)	1.212*** (4.89)
Four-year trend				-0.405* (-2.40)	-0.132* (-2.06)	-0.339* (-2.37)
GDP per capita	-0.185 (-1.85)	-0.285*** (-5.98)	0.547** (3.27)	-0.150 (-1.43)	-0.295*** (-5.79)	0.540** (3.13)
Population (logged)	0.300*** (3.60)	0.323*** (6.86)	0.427** (2.64)	0.276*** (3.33)	0.325*** (6.67)	0.408* (2.47)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0582** (3.25)	0.0229** (2.81)	0.00921 (0.32)	0.0527** (2.91)	0.0231** (2.71)	0.00390 (0.13)
Growth	-0.0003** (-3.12)	-0.0001 (-1.38)	-0.00001 (-0.22)	-0.0003*** (-3.38)	-0.0001 (-1.51)	-0.00002 (-0.27)
Regime transition	1.276* (2.44)	0.804*** (6.98)	0.700 (2.52)	1.352* (1.61)	0.784*** (6.44)	0.677 (1.54)
# of transitions	0.200 (1.07)	0.179* (2.43)	0.0606 (0.23)	0.164 (0.93)	0.171* (2.30)	0.0236 (0.08)
Country longevity	-0.0644 (-0.58)	0.182** (2.70)	1.082*** (4.07)	-0.149 (-1.23)	0.224** (2.88)	1.105*** (3.83)
Constant	-0.00846 (-0.01)	-1.993*** (-4.08)	-12.96*** (-6.15)	0.284 (0.30)	-2.124*** (-4.11)	-12.84*** (-6.03)
Inalpha						
Constant	1.452*** (14.51)	0.773*** (9.58)	2.836*** (14.32)	1.429*** (13.85)	0.794*** (9.54)	2.830*** (14.20)
chi2	61.153	285.481	119.414	59.144	258.046	116.347
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	3166	6115	4365	2948	5830	4283
alpha	4.271	2.166	17.044	4.173	2.212	16.949

t statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.1.3 Mobilization Trend and Antistate Violence
Independent variable: demonstrations (WHPS)

	(13) WHPS	(14) CNTS	(15) GTD	(16) WHPS	(17) CNTS	(18) GTD
One-year lag	0.139* (2.01)	0.0568 (1.73)	0.131 (1.63)			
Two-year trend	-0.0488 (-1.32)	-0.0109 (-0.98)	-0.0690 (-1.51)			
Two-year average lag				0.153* (2.13)	0.0573 (1.42)	0.138 (1.57)
Four-year trend				-0.0746* (-2.14)	-0.00762 (-0.40)	-0.0536 (-1.46)
GDP per capita	-0.329** (-3.19)	-0.301*** (-5.13)	0.814*** (3.40)	-0.327** (-3.02)	-0.310*** (-4.90)	0.835** (3.23)
Population (logged)	0.107 (1.27)	0.193*** (3.44)	-0.0239 (-0.12)	0.0445 (0.52)	0.177** (2.88)	-0.0914 (-0.44)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0412** (2.60)	0.0213* (2.08)	-0.0272 (-0.63)	0.0334* (2.14)	0.0208 (1.93)	-0.0362 (-0.83)
Growth	-0.000180* (-2.14)	-0.00001 (-0.17)	0.0000350 (0.48)	-0.000204* (-2.42)	-0.0000144 (-0.29)	0.0000335 (0.47)
Regime transition	1.092* (2.26)	0.555*** (3.83)	1.238* (2.22)	1.029* (2.44)	0.501*** (3.61)	1.265* (2.44)
# of transitions	0.248 (1.90)	0.308** (3.28)	0.0594 (0.30)	0.245* (1.98)	0.304** (3.19)	0.0718 (0.35)
Country longevity	-0.0536 (-0.63)	0.141* (2.21)	1.195*** (4.03)	-0.0685 (-0.78)	0.132* (2.00)	1.219*** (3.95)
Constant	2.282* (2.31)	-0.588 (-0.91)	-11.38*** (-5.08)	2.905** (2.83)	-0.305 (-0.43)	-11.00*** (-4.69)
Inalpha						
Constant	1.295*** (13.95)	0.624*** (7.29)	2.525*** (11.19)	1.238*** (12.45)	0.607*** (7.02)	2.461*** (10.98)
chi2	62.244	115.482	131.365	48.105	103.494	123.779
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2906	3091	1508	2616	2749	1356
alpha	3.651	1.867	12.496	3.447	1.836	11.714

t statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.1.4 Mobilization Trend and Antistate Violence
Independent variable: political strikes (WHPS)

	(19) WHPS	(20) CNTS	(21) GTD	(22) WHPS	(23) CNTS	(24) GTD
One-year lag	0.417*** (5.47)	0.248*** (4.30)	0.435** (3.17)			
Two-year trend	-0.157*** (-4.80)	-0.0954** (-3.13)	-0.231** (-2.95)			
Two-year average lag				0.503*** (5.59)	0.300*** (4.44)	0.485** (3.06)
Four-year trend				-0.200*** (-3.72)	-0.114*** (-3.39)	-0.191* (-2.46)
GDP per capita	-0.218* (-2.20)	-0.242*** (-4.36)	0.792** (3.27)	-0.230* (-2.28)	-0.259*** (-4.41)	0.823** (3.22)
Population (logged)	0.206** (2.60)	0.247*** (4.93)	0.0417 (0.21)	0.154* (1.96)	0.227*** (4.41)	0.00481 (0.02)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0417* (2.57)	0.0195 (1.89)	-0.0195 (-0.48)	0.0370* (2.28)	0.0186 (1.76)	-0.0254 (-0.62)
Growth	-0.000189* (-2.19)	-0.000005 (-0.10)	0.0000207 (0.28)	-0.000189* (-2.22)	-0.000011 (-0.22)	0.0000368 (0.57)
Regime transition	1.209* (2.22)	0.569*** (3.92)	1.243* (2.13)	0.626** (2.71)	0.486*** (3.46)	1.243* (2.03)
# of transitions	0.137 (0.97)	0.254** (2.64)	-0.0754 (-0.38)	0.125 (0.87)	0.226* (2.30)	-0.106 (-0.53)
Country longevity	-0.0940 (-1.03)	0.115 (1.83)	1.307*** (4.30)	-0.0916 (-0.98)	0.110 (1.67)	1.303*** (4.13)
Constant	0.964 (1.03)	-1.332* (-2.27)	-12.03*** (-5.23)	1.501 (1.56)	-0.998 (-1.63)	-11.90*** (-5.02)
lnalpha						
Constant	1.293*** (13.70)	0.636*** (7.73)	2.520*** (11.36)	1.238*** (12.67)	0.598*** (7.07)	2.448*** (11.29)
chi2	62.455	125.439	178.124	71.427	106.605	168.756
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2906	3091	1508	2616	2749	1356
alpha	3.645	1.889	12.429	3.449	1.818	11.560

t statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.1.5 Mobilization Trend and Antistate Violence
Independent variable: student strikes (WHPS)

	(25) WHPS	(26) CNTS	(27) GTD	(28) WHPS	(29) CNTS	(30) GTD
One-year lag	0.285 (1.14)	0.250 (1.76)	0.320 (1.01)			
Two-year trend	0.00216 (0.02)	-0.0586 (-0.78)	-0.0891 (-0.40)			
Two-year average lag				0.590 (1.32)	0.240 (0.90)	0.460 (1.00)
Four-year trend				-0.435 (-1.34)	0.0104 (0.05)	-0.231 (-0.86)
GDP per capita	-0.129 (-1.16)	-0.221*** (-3.54)	0.927*** (3.71)	-0.123 (-1.10)	-0.229*** (-3.41)	0.987*** (3.81)
Population (logged)	0.246** (2.84)	0.287*** (4.82)	0.105 (0.47)	0.207* (2.48)	0.275*** (4.32)	0.0660 (0.29)
Regime (Polity IV)	0.0627** (3.07)	0.0295** (2.65)	0.0112 (0.27)	0.0598** (2.78)	0.0297* (2.54)	0.00738 (0.18)
Growth	-0.000208* (-2.04)	-0.00002 (-0.39)	0.0000503 (0.75)	-0.000227* (-2.22)	-0.00003 (-0.50)	0.0000799 (1.31)
Regime transition	1.189** (2.69)	0.673*** (4.99)	1.218** (2.92)	0.615* (2.27)	0.600*** (4.53)	1.186** (2.78)
# of transitions	0.151 (0.94)	0.256** (2.58)	-0.0342 (-0.16)	0.131 (0.85)	0.250* (2.46)	-0.0228 (-0.11)
Country longevity	-0.0260 (-0.28)	0.140* (2.04)	1.302*** (4.12)	-0.0171 (-0.17)	0.136 (1.87)	1.296*** (3.96)
Constant	0.191 (0.19)	-1.742* (-2.52)	-13.24*** (-5.16)	0.535 (0.52)	-1.516* (-2.02)	-13.32*** (-5.01)
Inalpha						
Constant	1.404*** (13.74)	0.715*** (7.90)	2.600*** (11.63)	1.372*** (12.97)	0.699*** (7.51)	2.545*** (11.66)
chi2	58.222	119.430	112.051	55.039	103.744	102.625
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2906	3091	1508	2616	2749	1356
alpha	4.073	2.044	13.458	3.945	2.011	12.739

t statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$