

# **Integration of the Ethnic Chinese in Europe**

## **A Comparative Analysis of the Taiwanese and Migrants from China**

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### **Abstract**

In recent years, Europe has witnessed an influx of ethnic Chinese migrants. Yet, this community is largely overlooked. Scholars studying ethnic Chinese migrants tend to focus on other regions in the world. And, those who do investigate the region as a migration destination often look at non-Chinese migrant groups. Those who consider the ethnic Chinese in Europe often do so without disaggregating the national origins of the Chinese (i.e., they lump the Taiwanese and migrants from China into the same category, despite different political ideologies and social experiences). This shortcoming is addressed in this essay. Using original survey data of ethnic Chinese migrants in Europe, this study identifies key differences in their integration levels. The research finds that Taiwanese generally are more integrated than migrants from China—whether engaging with local authorities or being civically involved. There are two possible causes: one concerns preference congruence and a shared affinity; the other involves efficiency from regular, repeated interaction.

**Keywords:** Ethnic Chinese, Europe, integration, migration.

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**T**his essay examines two questions: What explains the integration of the ethnic Chinese migrants in Europe? And related, what explains the differences in integration levels between the Taiwanese and the migrants from China—if there are any? These are important questions for several reasons. First, in recent years, Europe has witnessed an influx of ethnic Chinese migrants. Nevertheless, this community is largely overlooked by scholars who study ethnic Chinese abroad. Historically, the focus has been dominated by Southeast Asia; and contemporarily, we have seen a shift primarily to the United States and secondarily to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Yet, Europe (i.e., the

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region to the west of Russia) is absent from this scholarly focus. In contrast, scholars who study migration to Europe have diverted the brunt of their attention to the Muslim migrants. And, even among those who focus on the Chinese, they often do so by ignoring the Taiwanese completely or lumping all the ethnic Chinese into the same category, despite differences in political ideology and social experiences between the Taiwanese and the migrants from China.

This essay addresses the above shortcoming. It focuses on the Taiwanese—and situates their experiences against those of the migrants from China. It looks at whether the polity of origin matters for integration. On the one hand, the essay argues that the Taiwanese—being demographically a smaller community, engaging in different economic activities, and being from a liberal democracy—have more incentives to integrate than the migrants from China. On the other hand, the essay contends it is possible that the inability of the locals to differentiate between the two types of ethnic Chinese renders their experiences similar.

The empirics for this essay draw from a large survey of the ethnic Chinese in Europe that includes Taiwanese (N=32) and migrants from China (N>2000). While the asymmetry between the two polities of origin is stark, it reflects empirical reality. As seen in table 1, the number of migrants from China in Europe completely overshadows the number of Taiwanese. Note that the numbers—per Eurostat (online code: mig\_pop1ctz)—for the migrants from China are reported in the *thousand* unit. The fact that there are statistically significant differences between the Taiwanese and the migrants from China is testament to the pronounced effect of national origin—and the importance of disaggregating the two polities.

The essay proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the origin of the ethnic Chinese in Europe, paying attention to the dearth of literature on the Taiwanese in the region. This is due to two trends: the first is a focus on the United States by Taiwanese migration scholars; the second is the dominance of China as a sending-state among European migration scholars. Section three reviews the literature on integration and situates it vis-à-vis the Taiwanese and the migrants from China. Next, the research design is presented, along with a discussion of the original project. Section five examines the empirical evidence. There are three sets of evidence. One relates to the Taiwanese versus the migrants from China. The second focuses on identifying the specific cause for the differences between the migrant groups—whether it concerns preference congruence and a shared affinity, or efficiency from regular, repeated interaction. Finally, the third disaggregates the migrants from China category into two types and compares them against the Taiwanese. In the final section, the essay notes some policy recommendations and identifies future avenues of research.

Table 1. Number of Ethnic Chinese in Europe, 2005–2019

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
From Taiwan															
Austria															
Belgium				396	360	352	353	345	374	457	457	467	479	504	583
Bulgaria				6	7	7	8	8	8	7	7	10	11	12	12
Czechia	31	61	132		209	293	332	256	207	257	266	269	442	431	583
Denmark	83	99	94	103	113	121	125	141	162	180	189	213	220	266	274
Estonia									1	5	3	2	2	2	1
Finland															
Germany	4199	4472	5042	5013	4932	4984		5452	5735	5713	6105	6367	6608	7215	7864
Hungary	48	77	89	98	102	140	157	142	147	138	158	231	226	237	300
Iceland						4	5	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
Ireland			116	122	140	148	147						328	313	332
Italy	327	400	399	483	470	479	489	283	402	481	461	547	559	581	657
Latvia		1										1	2	7	11
Lithuania										1	1	1	2	5	5
Luxembourg												29	24	35	43
Netherlands	1119	1220	1228	1277	1359	1372	1427	1485	1407	1418	1532	1648	1880	2029	2298
Norway	37	39	49	54	74	68	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal			10	8	18	23	26	35	42	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania								5	3	2	5	3	1	2	9
Slovakia	1	2	9	14	44	44	45	44	44	44	44	44	45	46	47
Slovenia								6	10	11	10	15	17	15	18
Spain															
Sweden	180	186	193	201	294	348	369	359	348	356	376	357	390	416	470
Switzerland	474	520	532	547	590	685	560	674	694	757	759	899	947	984	1028
UK															

Table 1. Number of Ethnic Chinese in Europe, 2005–2019 (continued)

	thousands																		
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019				
From China																			
Austria	8.3	8.8	8.9	9.3	9.4			9.7	10.1	10.8	11.4	12.1	12.7	12.9	13.2				
Belgium				8.3	8.3	8.7	9.9	10.4	10.8	11.2	11.4	11.7	12.1	12.3	12.9				
Bulgaria				0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5				
Czechia	2.5	3.3	3.8	4.4	4.7	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.8	6.4	6.7	7.2				
Denmark	5.9	6.2	6.1	6.6	7.2	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.8	8.4	8.9	6.9	10.1	10.5	10.9				
Estonia									0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4				
Finland	2.6	2.9	3.4	3.0	4.6	5.2	5.6	6.2	6.6	7.1	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.7	9.2				
Germany	71.6	73.8	80.6	83.3	83.7	85.3		73.6	80.7	88.3	97.5	104.6	116.6	125.9	133.3				
Hungary	6.9	8.6	9.0	10.2	10.7	11.2	11.8	10.1	11.5	12.7	16.5	19.8	19.1	19.9	18.9				
Iceland	0.2	0.6		0.4		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3				
Ireland			12.1	12.7	12.4	11.4	11.2						11.4	11.9	13.4				
Italy	112	129	145	157	166	168	184	197	223	257	266	271	282	291	300				
Latvia	0.04	0.04	0.05					0.04	0.05	0.07	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2				
Lithuania										0.03	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.1	0.2				
Luxembourg												2.8	3.2	3.5	3.7				
Netherlands	14.7	15.0	15.3	16.2	18.1	19.8	21.4	23.9	25.9	27.2	28.2	29.7	314	33.9	36.5				
Norway	1.9	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.6	4.1	4.3	4.8	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.9				
Portugal			10.8	11.0	13.3	14.4	15.7	16.8	17.5	18.7	21.5	21.4	22.6	23.2	25.4				
Romania								6.6	6.4	6.6	7.0	7.3	7.5	6.6	6.8				
Slovakia	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0				
Slovenia	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2				
Spain	82.1	99.8	112	122	150	160	167	171	170	166	168	172	178	183	191				
Sweden	6.1	6.7	6.9	7.7	9.4	11.8	14.1	15.5	16.2	17.1	17.5	16.6	17.3	18.6	20.2				
Switzerland	7.9	7.8	7.3	7.7	8.3	8.9	10.3	11.3	12.7	14.8	16.0	17.1	17.9	18.4	18.9				
UK	77.9				105	102	114	122	106	92.3	123	142	139	149	132				

## The Taiwanese in Europe

Despite the large numbers of Taiwanese abroad, and despite Europe as a popular migration destination in general, very little work has been devoted to the Taiwanese in Europe. It seems to have fallen through the cracks where two bodies of literature meet. The first group of scholarship focuses on the ethnic Chinese abroad. This literature has been dominated historically by Southeast Asia—not shocking, given the early migration patterns from Fujian and Guangdong. And, among scholars who look at Taiwan as the polity of origin, the attention has been primarily on the United States. When the United States adopted the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, it opened the doors for Taiwanese migrants. Previously, with a national origin formula, migrants from Asia were prohibited from migrating to the United States.<sup>1</sup> But under the new migration regime, the Taiwanese quickly constituted the largest Asian student population.<sup>2</sup> While the Taiwanese often are depicted as “model minorities,”<sup>3</sup> we are seeing behavioral changes when it comes to running for office or donating to campaigns; shifting their attitudes toward the homeland; and increasing their numbers as self-identified democrats or independents.<sup>4</sup>

The attention to Taiwanese migrants has spread beyond the United States to other Western democracies—most notably Australia,<sup>5</sup> Canada,<sup>6</sup> and New Zealand.<sup>7</sup> Yet, Europe remains largely absent in any of this discussion. For example, in 2014, Kuei-fen Chiu, Dafydd Fell, and Lin Ping edited a book entitled *Migration to and from Taiwan*.<sup>8</sup> Several chapters focus on the movement of the Taiwanese to China—and as far as Canada and Guam. But the remaining chapters are about migration *into* Taiwan.

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<sup>1</sup> Madeline Y. Hsu, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> Jeanette Yih Harvie and Pei-te Lien, “The Political Socialization of Taiwanese American Immigrants,” *Chinese America: History and Perspectives* (2017): 1-11.

<sup>3</sup> Hsu, *The Good Immigrants*.

<sup>4</sup> Nicole Filler and Pei-te Lien, “Asian Pacific Americans in U.S. Politics: Gender and Pathways to Elected Office,” in *Distinct Identities: Minority Women in U.S. Politics*, ed. Nadia Brown and Sarah Allen Gershon (New York: Routledge, 2016), 218-233.

<sup>5</sup> Lan-hung Nora Chiang, “Middle-Class Taiwanese Immigrant Women Adapt to Life in Australasia: Case Studies from Transnational Households,” *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 10, no. 4 (2004): 31-57; Lan-Hung Nora Chiang and Jung-Chung Richard Hsu, “Locational Decisions and Residential Preferences of Taiwanese Immigrants in Australia,” *GeoJournal* 64, no. 1 (2005): 75-89; and David Ip, Chung-tong Wu, and Christine Inglis, “Settlement Experiences of Taiwanese Immigrants in Australia,” *Asian Studies Review* 22, no. 1 (1998): 79-97.

<sup>6</sup> Lan-Hung Nora Chiang, “Return Migration: The Case of the 1.5 Generation of Taiwanese in Canada and New Zealand,” *China Review* (2011): 91-123, and Lloyd L. Wong, “Taiwanese Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Canada and Transnational Social Space,” *International Migration* 42, no. 2 (2004): 113-152.

<sup>7</sup> Tania Boyer. “Problems in Paradise: Taiwanese Immigrants to Auckland, New Zealand,” *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 37, no. 1 (1996): 59-80, and Chiang, “Return Migration.”

<sup>8</sup> Kuei-fen Chiu, Dafydd Fell, and Lin Ping, *Migration to and from Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 2014).

In contrast to focusing on the polity of origin, the second group of scholarship looks at the destination (i.e., Europe). Within this literature, two movements are of primary interest. The first is about the movement of East Europeans into Western Europe (e.g., the Poles to Britain,<sup>9</sup> the Hungarians to Germany,<sup>10</sup> or the Bulgarians and Romanians to Spain).<sup>11</sup> The other movement of significant interest is that of Muslims—whether it is South Asians,<sup>12</sup> Middle Easterners,<sup>13</sup> Turks,<sup>14</sup> or Africans.<sup>15</sup>

Because the two movements are large, they seem to dwarf the trend of ethnic Chinese moving into Europe. Yet, ethnic Chinese were the third—and now the fourth in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis—largest migrant community in Europe.<sup>16</sup> We do see a small group of scholars working on this topic. The annual convention of the Chinese Migration to and beyond Europe—a research platform launched by Li Minghuan and Mette Thuno—is testament to this focus. Yet, within this segment of scholarship is the marginalization of the Taiwanese in any discussion. For example, in Gregor Benton and Frank Pieke’s seminal work on the ethnic Chinese in Europe,<sup>17</sup> the Taiwanese appear in four unique

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<sup>9</sup> Magdalena Nowicka and Łukasz Krzyżowski, “The Social Distance of Poles to Other Minorities: A Study of Four Cities in Germany and Britain,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 3 (2017): 359-378; Peter D. Stachura, *The Poles in Britain, 1940–2000: From Betrayal to Assimilation* (London: Routledge, 2004); and Jerzy Zubrzycki, *Polish Immigrants in Britain: A Study of Adjustment* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956).

<sup>10</sup> Lee Congdon, *Exile and Social Thought: Hungarian Intellectuals in Germany and Austria, 1919–1933* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Florian Lehmer and Johannes Ludsteck, “The Immigrant Wage Gap in Germany: Are East Europeans Worse Off?” *International Migration Review* 45, no. 4 (2011): 872-906; and Beáta Siska-Szilasi, Tibor Kóródi, and Péter Vadnai, “Measuring and Interpreting Emigration Intentions of Hungarians,” *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 65, no. 4 (2016): 361-368.

<sup>11</sup> Cristina E. Bradatan and Dumitru Sandu, “Before Crisis: Gender and Economic Outcomes of the Two Largest Immigrant Communities in Spain,” *International Migration Review* 46, no. 1 (2012): 221-243; Tim Elrick and Ruxandra Oana Ciobanu, “Migration Networks and Policy Impacts: Insights from Romanian–Spanish Migrations,” *Global Networks* 9, no. 1 (2009): 100-116; and Mikołaj Stanek, “Patterns of Romanian and Bulgarian Migration to Spain,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 9 (2009): 1627-1644.

<sup>12</sup> Rahsaan Maxwell, “Evaluating Migrant Integration: Political Attitudes across Generations in Europe,” *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (2010): 25-52.

<sup>13</sup> Rafaela M. Dancygier, *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

<sup>14</sup> Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 35-49.

<sup>15</sup> Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

<sup>16</sup> Amy H. Liu, “Public Attitudes and the Chinese Migrants in Central-Eastern Europe,” *International Migration*: forthcoming (2021).

<sup>17</sup> Gregor Benton and Frank N. Pieke, *The Chinese in Europe* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

discussions. As a point of comparison, the Surinamese Chinese are mentioned three times. Alternatively, other scholars lump the Taiwanese with migrants from China into the same category as “Chinese” (or “Asian” at-large), despite important differences between these ethnic Chinese communities.<sup>18</sup>

There are a few exceptions, of course. For example, Maggi Leung looks at how the Taiwanese have dominated the computer-sales sector in Germany.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand, this ethnic enclave mirrors what we have come to see with ethnic niches globally. On the other hand, these global enclaves have traditionally emerged in low-skilled (e.g., nail salons) or service-intensive (e.g., restaurant business) industries. In this regard, the Taiwanese are unusual; however, efforts such as this—to isolate for the Taiwanese—are the exception. This essay builds on these works and addresses this gap. It focuses not just on the Taiwanese in Europe, but also it situates their integration experiences vis-à-vis the migrants from China in a comparative tradition—much like Carolyn Chen’s, Angie Y. Chung’s, and Pei-te Lien’s work in the United States.<sup>20</sup>

The Taiwanese population in Europe—when defined by the passport—is about 15,000. This number is certainly an undercount. It does not include France, the United Kingdom, and several other countries that simply do not report any polity of origin. It also does not include Austria and Spain, which had no figures for Taiwan (unlike Iceland, where there simply were no Taiwanese). Fifteen thousand pales in comparison to the Taiwanese community in the United States. It is also marginal compared to the population of migrants from China in Europe: for each Taiwanese migrant in Europe, there are seventy-some migrants from China. But as we will see with the survey results, there are some defining features that characterize the Taiwanese community—warranting that it be differentiated.

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<sup>18</sup> Hélène Le Bail, “Emerging Political Participation of the Chinese—French Population,” in the 3rd CERPE Workshop, “Chinese in Europe, New Mobilities and Development,” East Asian Studies and Research Center, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, 2018, and Amy H. Liu, *The Language of Political Incorporation: The Chinese in Europe* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, forthcoming, 2021).

<sup>19</sup> Maggi W. H. Leung, “Get IT Going: New Ethnic Chinese Business. The Case of Taiwanese-Owned Computer Firms in Hamburg,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 2 (2001): 277-294.

<sup>20</sup> Carol Chen, *Getting Saved in America: Taiwanese Immigration and Religious Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Angie Y. Chung, *Saving Face: The Emotional Costs of the Asian Immigrant Family Myth* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2016); Pei-te Lien, “Transnational Homeland Concerns and Participation in U.S. Politics: A Comparison among Immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 2, no. 1 (2006): 56-78; id., “Chinese American Attitudes towards Homeland Government and Politics”; and id., “Comparing Political Socialization in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan: Perspectives on the Teaching and Learning of Citizenship,” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 2 (2015): 109-136.

## Polities of Origin and Ethnic Chinese Integration

Some migration scholars have focused on the politics of origin to explain integration levels, that is, “the extent to which migrants are members of a host society’s community.”<sup>21</sup> For example, a large cultural distance between two polities can make integration experiences more challenging,<sup>22</sup> although interestingly, there also is evidence to suggest the converse (i.e., a greater cultural affinity can discourage integration efforts).<sup>23</sup> And, while the Taiwanese and the migrants from China may draw from the same civilization,<sup>24</sup> this study contends that their distinct polities of origin translate into different integration levels. There are three reasons to believe why integration is not the same for Taiwanese as it is for migrants from China.

The first reason pertains to community size. While China was quick to become one of the largest sending-states to Europe, Taiwan was not. This difference meant that, while the migrants from China could afford to self-segregate,<sup>25</sup> the Taiwanese could not, as they had to interact more regularly with the locals. Stated differently, the Taiwanese had less of a safety net on which they could rely when there was some environmental uncertainty—whether it was validating a ticket on public transportation or picking up a package at the post office. Learning from such repeated interaction with the locals provided a channel through which the Taiwanese were able to develop out-group trust. In contrast, the migrants from China were able to consume their information in Chinese, interact (almost) exclusively with other migrants from China, and possibly even marry other migrants from China.<sup>26</sup>

The second reason concerns the economic activities in which Chinese and Taiwanese participate. Migrants from China traditionally have engaged in the wholesale of cheap “Made in China” goods in Chinatowns or worked in the

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<sup>21</sup> Rahsaan Maxwell, *Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration Trade-Offs* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> John W. Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” *Applied Psychology* 46, no. 1 (1997): 5-34; Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiff, “The Political Economy of Social Exclusion, with Implications for Immigration Policy,” *Journal of Population Economics* 19, no. 2 (2006): 327-44; and Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 35-49.

<sup>23</sup> Claire L. Adida, *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

<sup>25</sup> Amy H. Liu, “The Isolation of Chinese Migrants in Eastern Europe: Survey Data from Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 13, no. 1 (2017): 31-47.

<sup>26</sup> Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, “Ethnic Networks and Language Proficiency among Immigrants,” *Journal of Population Economics* 9, no. 1 (1996): 19-35.



restaurant business.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, Taiwanese are more inclined to open small shops, work in service industries bridging the Chinese and local communities (e.g., translations), or participate in religious activities such as Buddhist temples or Protestant churches.<sup>28</sup> Taiwanese also are active in the technology industries—most notably computer chips.<sup>29</sup> The type of economic activity is important, here, for two reasons. First, Chinatowns invoke some sort of spatial concept—meaning those involved with these neighborhoods are likely to be segregated.<sup>30</sup> The second reason is that wholesale is generally associated with low levels of education. There is evidence that less schooling impedes integration.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, we would expect the Taiwanese and the migrants from China to behave differently because of the political environment in the two respective home polities. Taiwan is a liberal democracy: elections are not just free and fair, but also regular. The alternations between Taiwan's two major parties are testament to the vibrancy of Taiwanese democracy. Moreover, civil liberties are widely protected, making Taiwan, according to Freedom House, one of the more liberal polities in all of Asia. Related, there is a tradition of multiculturalism.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, China has an authoritarian regime monopolized by a single party; there is no pretense whatsoever of regularized elections. Likewise, civil liberties often are proscribed. This distinction is important because migrants from countries with limited liberties are generally less inclined to engage with host countries<sup>33</sup>—although there also is evidence to suggest that when people are given newfound freedoms, they are more likely to integrate.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Liu, “The Isolation of Chinese Migrants in Eastern Europe,” and Pál Nyíri, *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia: A Middleman Minority in a Transnational Era* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>28</sup> Liu, *The Language of Political Incorporation*.

<sup>29</sup> Leung, “Get IT Going.”

<sup>30</sup> Gary McDonogh and Cindy Wong, “Beside Downtowns: Global Chinatowns,” in *Global Downtowns*, ed. Marina Peterson and Gary McDonogh (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 273-296.

<sup>31</sup> John Iceland and Melissa Scopilliti, “Immigrant Residential Segregation in US Metropolitan Areas, 1990–2000,” *Demography* 45, no. 1 (2008): 79-94.

<sup>32</sup> Jens Damm, “Multiculturalism in Taiwan and the Influence of Europe,” in *European Perspectives on Taiwan*, ed. Jens Damm and Paul Lim (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer, 2012), 84-103.

<sup>33</sup> Catherine Simpson Bueker, “Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects,” *International Migration Review* 39, no. 1 (2005): 103-140, and Janelle Wong, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn, *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011).

<sup>34</sup> Louis DeSipio, “Immigrant Organizing, Civic Outcomes: Civic Engagement, Political Activity, National Attachment, and Identity in Latino Immigrant Communities” (Irvine, CA: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002).

Integration, however, does not happen in a vacuum (i.e., the locals matter as well). Specifically, when the host country is welcoming, this can encourage cross-cultural exchanges; conversely, when outsiders are viewed with disdain, this can disincentivize integration efforts by migrants. To this end, while the Taiwanese may see themselves as distinct from migrants from China, it is possible that local Europeans do not see this distinction. For them, the two migrant communities are effectively lumped together in the same group: “Chinese,” if not “Asian.” Even if the locals are familiar with cross-Strait tensions and sympathetic to Taiwan, this does not mean they can identify *ex ante* a migrant’s polity of origin. All else being equal, since there are more migrants from China, locals are likely to assume Taiwanese are as well. And, if attitudes toward the migrants from China were negative, this could spill over to the Taiwanese.<sup>35</sup> Given this discussion, the essay posits the two following competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1.1: Integration levels are higher for the Taiwanese than they are for migrants from China.

Hypothesis 1.2: Integration levels are no different between the Taiwanese and migrants from China.

By comparing the polities of origin, the discussion thus far treats the migrants from China as a homogeneous group. But this is certainly not the case. While the first wave of migrants from China to Europe in the post-Mao era was from the northeast,<sup>36</sup> the migrant population today is dominated by southerners, particularly those from Zhejiang.<sup>37</sup> This pattern is distinct from that of Southeast Asia or North America. In many European countries, the Zhejiang population is more than half of the entire Chinese community. In Croatia, for example, migrants from Zhejiang constitute almost 90 percent of the ethnic Chinese population.<sup>38</sup> Their size has permitted them to form separate subnational networks. Additionally, given their distinct vernaculars, the barriers to the networks are high. Only those who can speak *zhejianghua*

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<sup>35</sup> Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang, and Jessica C. Teets, “Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration,” *World Politics* 66, no. 3 (2014): 406-445.

<sup>36</sup> Nyíri, *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia*.

<sup>37</sup> Felix B. Chang and Sunnie T. Rucker-Chang, eds., *Chinese Migrants in Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), and Anna Krasteva, “Chinese in Bulgaria,” in *The Borders of the Polity: Migration and Security across the EU and the Balkans*, ed. Luisa Chiodi (Ravenna, Italy: Longo Editore, 2005), 59-80.

<sup>38</sup> Liu, “The Isolation of Chinese Migrants in Eastern Europe,” and id., *The Language of Political Incorporation*.

(i.e., Wu) or *wenzhouhua* can access the coveted resources. As a result, these bonding,<sup>39</sup> intra-ethnic<sup>40</sup> networks are largely insular.<sup>41</sup> This insularity means there is minimal contact with others of different backgrounds— whether other migrants from China or the locals.

In contrast, the non-Zhejiang migrants from China are more likely to operate in bridging, inter-ethnic networks, in which the medium of communication is *putonghua* (i.e., Mandarin). When locals learn “Chinese,” Mandarin is the vernacular they study; and when there are exchanges between locals and the Chinese, they take place in the local European language or in Mandarin. Thus, integration levels are higher among this subset of migrants from China. Given this discussion, it is possible that the difference in integration is not between the Taiwanese and the migrants from China per se, but rather between the Taiwanese and the Zhejiang migrants from China, specifically. We see this in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Integration levels are higher among the Taiwanese than among the Zhejiang migrants from China.

## Research Design

To examine the integration of the Taiwanese, the essay draws on survey data from a larger project about ethnic Chinese migration to Central-Eastern Europe: Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Croatia. These five cases were selected because they have the largest ethnic Han Chinese population in the region. In 1989, when Hungary waived visa requirements for passport holders from China, it launched a wave of ethnic Chinese migrants into the country. Overnight, 50,000 ethnic Chinese migrants showed up—causing the Hungarian government to reimpose visa requirements from fear of a public backlash.<sup>42</sup> Many of the 50,000 have since moved on, but today, Hungary remains home to one of the largest Chinese populations—not just in Central-Eastern Europe but in all of Europe. As a point of comparison, there are more ethnic Chinese in Hungary than in Sweden.

To ensure that the findings are not merely the result of some latent, unobserved regional effect, the author selected a country in a different European periphery: Portugal. Portugal has the advantage of being a member of the Schengen and Euro zone.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, it does not have the legacy of

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<sup>39</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

<sup>40</sup> Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

<sup>41</sup> Liu, *The Language of Political Incorporation*.

<sup>42</sup> Nyíri, *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia*.

<sup>43</sup> Of the five countries, only Hungary is in the Schengen zone (joined in 2007). Note that none of the five uses the Euro.

communism. And, most importantly (perhaps), it is in Western Europe—and proximate to Spain and France (two of the big three countries where there are large Chinese populations). Pairwise, Hungary and Portugal offer a natural comparison. As illustrated in table 2, the ethnic Chinese population is similar between the two countries, whether it is in population size, their history in the country, or government rhetoric toward them.

Table 2. Tale of Two Cities (and Countries)

	Hungary	Portugal
Distance from China	7,349 km	9,678 km
GDP/Capita (2013)	19,800 USD	22,900 USD
Chinese Population	15,000–20,000	17,000–22,000
Arrival of First Chinese	1989	1980
Democratic Transition Year	1989	1976
Visa Waiver Period	1989–1991	–1986
Government Rhetoric	Positive	Positive
Special Residency Program	State Bonds (250,000 €)	Golden Visa (500,000 €)
	Budapest	Lisbon
Chinatown in Capital	Józsefváros	Martim Moniz
Population (Metro Area)	3,284,110	3,035,000
Chinese Population: Capital	15,000–20,000	12,000–17,000

While the inclusion of Portugal in the Central-Eastern Europe sample may seem odd, these cases share two common denominators. First, from an empirical standpoint, when talking about migrant numbers, there always is a concern about the undocumented population. From an empirical standpoint, undocumented populations can be problematic. Given their status, these individuals can be more hesitant to answer surveys; and when this population is large, there is some risk that a sizable subset of the Chinese community is omitted from the surveyed sample. Indeed, there inevitably is an undocumented—if not outright illegal—population in all the surveyed countries. But while present, the numbers seem a far cry from those of Italy, where one or two of eight to ten workers are undocumented.<sup>44</sup>

The second common denominator is a practical one. In all six studied countries, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population resides in the capital. For example, in Budapest, there is a large concentration of

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<sup>44</sup> Antonella Ceccagno, “New Chinese Migrants in Italy,” *International Migration* 41, no. 3 (2003): 187-213.

ethnic Chinese in District VIII. The neighborhood, Józsefváros, is known by the locals as “Chinatown.” Likewise, in Bucharest, the ethnic Chinese community is primarily in Sector 2, specifically, in a neighborhood known as Colentina. Dragonul Rosu (Red Dragon, i.e., “Chinatown”) is in Colentina. Similarly, in Lisbon, “Chinatown” is in an area known as Martim Moniz and nearby the Moorish quarter. While there certainly are ethnic Chinese in areas outside places such as Józsefváros, Colentina, and Martim Moniz, the high concentration in these distinct neighborhoods made it possible and easier to recruit survey respondents.

The surveys were administered to collect information on the ethnic Chinese population. In each city, the author trained ethnic Chinese research assistants and employed their help. The assistants were local residents. The author collected original survey data, using convenience samples, snowball samples, and random-walk samples. The random walks took place in the neighborhoods discussed above. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the respondents in the survey were migrants from China. However, thirty-two Taiwanese respondents also were surveyed. While trying to draw conclusions from such a small sample is statistically challenging, the general trends are nonetheless informative. Moreover, if there is a significant difference between the two migrant groups, this can carry substantial power. The surveys were bilingual: (simplified) Chinese and the host European language. With the exception of ten cases, all the respondents opted to respond in the Chinese language. And, of the ten exceptions, none was Taiwanese.

Table 3 shows some of the basic demographics for, and thus between, the Taiwanese and the migrants from China. What is noteworthy is that the average Taiwanese respondent is ten years younger than a Chinese counterpart. The Taiwanese are more likely to be female: three of every four respondents were female. In contrast, two of every four migrants from China were female. The Taiwanese have been in Europe for more than a decade (eleven years); the average duration for a migrant from China is just under a decade (nine years). And, when it comes to wealth, the Taiwanese were not as well-off as the migrants from China. It is possible that this is the true state of the two communities; it also could reflect hesitation by the Taiwanese to admit their wealth, optimism by the migrants from China, or the challenges of this measure. While the average respondent in both communities was not inclined to stay in the surveyed European country, the Taiwanese was more likely to talk about moving to another country than the migrant from China, who preferred returning to the homeland.

Traditionally, measures of integration focus on voting, protesting, or naturalizing. This study does not consider these conventional measures for a simple reason: the government in China does not permit dual citizenship—thereby limiting the number of people who choose to naturalize. And, without European citizenship, there is no voting. Although protest is possible in the absence of citizenship, the fear of deportation can hamper engagement. To

Table 3. The Average Respondent in Comparative Perspective

	Taiwanese Migrant	Migrant from China
Age	27.6	37.5
Female (%)	75	47
Duration of Stay (years)	11.1	9.3
Upper-Middle Class (%)	13	35
Stay in Host Country (%)	13	20
Return to China/Taiwan (%)	40	70
Move to Third Country (%)	63	28

this end, the research considers four alternative measures. The first is the respondent's willingness to engage the local authorities. The second looks at the respondent's (recalled—and perceived) experiences at the immigration office. The third focuses on one's attitude toward the locals, specifically, whether a respondent considers the locals to be trustworthy. This last question taps at one's altruism: how willing is the respondent to help a local who is lost? These questions are four of the many often used in public opinion surveys to measure political trust and social integration. The research was narrowed to these four questions, based on pre-test results and focus group feedback.

To account for possible confounding factors, the study included five controls. The first was the age of the respondent. There is evidence in the literature that older respondents are less inclined to integrate.<sup>45</sup> The second consideration was the respondent's gender. There are works that show women to be less tolerant and more distrustful than men.<sup>46</sup> Yet, there are scholars who show the opposite effects.<sup>47</sup> And then there are those who find no effects whatsoever.<sup>48</sup> Third, the research included a control for duration (i.e., time in country). There are two different mechanisms that could be in play. One is that the migrants who are not integrated are more likely to have left the country—whether returning home or moving to another country. Either way,

<sup>45</sup> Rima Wilkes, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris, "'No Thanks, We're Full': Individual Characteristics, National Context, and Changing Attitudes toward Immigration," *International Migration Review* 42, no. 2 (2008): 302-329.

<sup>46</sup> Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance," *Political Behavior* 21, no. 1 (1999): 43-66, and Pippa Norris, "Institutional Explanations for Political Support," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-235.

<sup>47</sup> Lauren M. McLaren, "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants," *Social Forces* 81, no. 3 (2003): 909-936.

<sup>48</sup> Bernadette C. Hayes and Lizanne Dowds, "Social Contact, Cultural Marginality or Economic Self-Interest? Attitudes towards Immigrants in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006): 455-476.

they never were included in the survey. The other mechanism is that those migrants who have been in the country for quite some time are also more likely to have integrated. Whether it is one mechanism or both simultaneously, it was expected that duration would have a positive effect on integration.<sup>49</sup>

The fourth variable is an unorthodox one. Respondents were asked whether they would send their children to a Western university (whether in Western Europe or the United States). This variable—an education variable—is a proxy for wealth.<sup>50</sup> It was not possible to directly ask about wealth because in the pre-tests and focus groups many of the respondents opted not to answer questions about income. Those who did often misrepresented; there (seemingly) were an equal number of overestimations and underestimations.<sup>51</sup> In response, under the advisement from other local scholars who were part of a team that fielded the largest survey project to the most diverse migrant population in Budapest,<sup>52</sup> the focus was shifted away from physical capital per se to human capital investments. But, here, there was a second challenge: using conventional measures of education. Many of the surveyed migrants from China were affected by the Cultural Revolution. As a solution, given the two constraints—but considering the importance of family in Chinese culture—the focus was shifted to the respondents’ children. Last, the research included a control for whether the respondent was in Portugal. There is some evidence to suggest that trust levels in Central-Eastern Europe are lower than in Western Europe.<sup>53</sup>

## Empirical Evidence

Figure 1 plots the variation in integration across all four measures between the Taiwanese and the migrants from China. As a reminder, the measure for having experienced discrimination at the immigration office is inversely worded

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<sup>49</sup> Iceland and Scopilliti, “Immigrant Residential Segregation in US Metropolitan Areas, 1990–2000.”

<sup>50</sup> Jacob Mincer, *Schooling, Experience, and Earnings* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974).


<sup>51</sup> Anna Krasteva mentioned she experienced over-estimations that were blatant (e.g., “one million euros a month”). These extreme over-estimations were meant to be a signal of non-cooperation—while going through the act of cooperation. Private conversation in Sofia, Bulgaria (April 12, 2014).

<sup>52</sup> Antal Örkény and Mária Székelyi, “Hat migráns csoport összehasonlító elemzése” [The comparative analysis of six migrant groups], in *Az Idegen Magyarország: Bevándorlók Társadalmi Integrációja* [The foreign Hungary: Social integration of immigrants], ed. Antal Örkény and Mária Székelyi (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Eötvös Kiadó Kft, 2010), 49-96.

<sup>53</sup> Zolt Boda and Gergo Medve-Balint, “Does Institutional Trust in East Central Europe Differ from Western Europe?” *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities* 3, no. 2 (2014), and János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

(i.e., a higher value would indicate a more negative experience). Across all four measures, we see that the Taiwanese respondents are more positive than the migrants from China. They are thirty percentage points more likely to report a robbery if they have been robbed, and they are one-third as likely to recall having experienced discrimination at the immigration office. They are twenty percentage points more likely to find the locals trustworthy. And every Taiwanese respondent expressed willingness to help a local who was lost—a figure double that of the migrants from China.

Figure 1. Integration Levels:  
Taiwanese versus Migrants from China (% Affirmative)



As a first cut, it seems that the Taiwanese migrants exhibit integration levels that are consistently higher than those among migrants from China. Of course, there are systematic differences between the two communities, as seen in table 1. To consider this possibility, several multivariate logistic regressions were run to control for the respondent’s age, gender, duration in the country, and self-reported income. There also was a control for whether the respondent was in Portugal—on the off chance that there would be a West European effect. The results are presented in table 4.

Across all four models, the coefficient for Taiwan is statistically significant and in the correct direction. For example, model 1 shows that, when robbed, a Taiwanese respondent is almost five times more likely than a migrant from China to go to the police ( $\beta=1.589$ ;  $SE=0.740$ ). This effect is substantially larger than for any of the other controls. The only other variable of significance



Table 4. Explaining Integration:  
Taiwanese versus Migrants from China

	If Robbed: Report Robbery	Discrimination @ Immigration	Locals are Trustworthy	Would Help a Lost Local
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Taiwanese	1.589 (0.740) <sup>†</sup>	-1.433 (0.521) <sup>†</sup>	1.298 (0.706) <sup>*</sup>	1.944 (0.727) <sup>‡</sup>
Age	0.003 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.004) <sup>‡</sup>	0.011 (0.006) <sup>*</sup>	0.000 (0.004)
Female	0.128 (0.102)	-0.170 (0.093) <sup>*</sup>	0.061 (0.110)	0.129 (0.093)
Time in Country	0.001 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.060 (0.009) <sup>‡</sup>
Upper-Middle Class	0.288 (0.109) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.440 (0.098) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.287 (0.113) <sup>†</sup>	-0.022 (0.096)
Portugal	0.014 (0.142)	-0.337 (0.133) <sup>†</sup>	-0.266 (0.144) <sup>*</sup>	0.470 (0.134) <sup>‡</sup>
Constant	0.893 (0.230) <sup>‡</sup>	0.147 (0.159)	1.271 (0.210) <sup>‡</sup>	0.024 (0.149)
N	2215	2221	2225	2218
Wald $\chi^2$	14.19 <sup>‡</sup>	56.57 <sup>‡</sup>	19.29 <sup>‡</sup>	81.17 <sup>‡</sup>
Log Likelihood	-1192.896	-1367.443	-1048.819	-1367.331

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. \*  $p \leq 0.100$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ , and <sup>‡</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ .

is that of wealth: the wealthy were 33 percent more likely to go to the police in the event of a robbery.

Likewise, a migrant from China is four times more likely than a Taiwanese to claim having experienced discrimination at the immigration office ( $\beta=-1.433$ ;  $SE=0.521$ )—see model 2. This is telling. If the locals are treating all ethnic Chinese the same, it does not seem that the discrimination is manifesting equally across the two passport covers. Or, if it is, it is not being perceived equally by the two groups of nationals. In model 2, we see more control variables as significant. Older respondents are less likely than younger ones to perceive discrimination, but this effect is quite marginal. Women are almost 15 percent less likely than men to report having had a bad experience at the immigration office. Likewise, the wealthy answered in the negative; in fact, they are 65 percent less likely than respondents of lower income to recall discrimination. And, finally, here we see some Western Europe effect—or at least a Portugal effect. Respondents in Portugal had fewer negative experiences than those in Hungary ( $\beta=-0.337$ ;  $SE=0.133$ ). But note that in model 2, the singular coefficient with the most pronounced effect is that of Taiwan.

What happens when we shift our attention away from the authorities to the general population? Model 3 looks at whether respondents think locals are trustworthy. The results suggest that the Taiwanese respondents are almost

four times more likely than those from China to answer in the affirmative ( $\beta=1.298$ ;  $SE=0.706$ ). This is a substantial effect. Consider age. While an older respondent is more likely to find the locals more trustworthy, the difference between a thirty-seven-year-old (sample mean) and a twenty-four-year-old (one standard deviation difference) is one percentage point. But where we see major differences from the two previous models is with respect to wealth and Portugal. Wealthier respondents are 75 percent less likely to find the locals trustworthy. Likewise, a respondent in Portugal is significantly less inclined to trust the locals (also 75 percent less likely) than a respondent in the other five countries of the study's focus.

The effects are not simply about some abstract, generalized trust. We see them manifest as well when respondents are asked whether they would help a local who is lost. It turns out, the Taiwanese not only are more likely to help ( $\beta=1.944$ ;  $SE=0.727$ ), but also they are seven times more likely to do so than migrants from China! As with previous models, this effect is by far the most pronounced. Other variables that also are significant include length of stay ( $\beta=0.060$ ;  $SE=0.009$ ) and whether the respondent was in Portugal ( $\beta=0.470$ ;  $SE=0.134$ ).


### ***Identifying the Mechanism***

There are two possible explanations for the higher integration levels among the Taiwanese respondents than among the migrants from China. The first is about affinity. It is possible that the Taiwanese are more likely to value the same outcomes as the locals. Alternatively, the Taiwanese may prefer to interact with the locals—more so than the migrants from China. This congruence in taste makes integration easier. If this is the case, we should see it manifest in shared affinity. One way to test this affinity is to employ a hypothetical fan's test. The fan's test is an experiment devised by sociologists asking (im)migrants to identify their sports loyalty. Whether it is Hispanics in the United States or South Asians in Great Britain, respondents are asked which team they would support when the home country plays the host country in soccer (in the American example) or in cricket (in the British case). In the same spirit, the author asked respondents about their sports allegiance in the World Table Tennis Championships. Questions were asked about three match pairings. The first concerned an ethnic Chinese from China against a local European athlete. The focus of the second pairing was an ethnic Chinese from a Southeast Asian country against the same local European athlete. The third pairing was a Southeast Asian—but a non-ethnic Chinese—against the European. If the Taiwanese respondents have more affinity for the locals, we should see this reflected in their responses in these hypothetical table tennis matchups. Specifically, we should see the following:

Prediction 1: Support for local European athletes is higher  
among the Taiwanese than among the migrants  
from China.

As we see in figure 2, the Taiwanese respondents, across the board, are more likely than the migrants from China to support the local European athlete. In terms of raw percentages, one of every two Taiwanese respondents would support the local European in the first scenario. In contrast, only one of every ten migrants from China shares similar sentiments. When it comes to the second match—between the local European and an ethnic Chinese Southeast Asian national—the numbers jump for both groups to over 50 percent. However, the Taiwanese are still a good twenty percentage points more likely to support the locals. We see the gap close—to fifteen percentage points—in the third scenario.

Figure 2. Support for European Athlete in World Table Tennis Championship (% Affirmative)



The differences are statistically significant, and they remain so even after controlling for possible confounding factors (see table 5). Compared to a migrant from China, a Taiwanese is (1) six times more likely to support the local European when the opponent is an ethnic Chinese from China (see model 1); (2) five times more likely to support the local European when the opponent is an ethnic Chinese Southeast Asian national (see model 2); and (3) three times more likely to support the local European when the opponent is a non-ethnic Chinese Southeast Asian national (see model 3). These effects dwarf those of the other variables. Consider age, for example. Older respondents are 2 percent more likely than younger ones to support the locals; but women are 20 percent less likely than men. Duration also matters. Each

additional year increases support by about one percent, an effect consistent with Robert Dahl<sup>54</sup> who argued a linear relationship between duration and integration. Respondents residing in Portugal are up to 50 percent more likely than respondents living elsewhere in Europe to support the locals. But where we see the largest extreme is with respect to wealth. On the one hand, wealthier respondents are 60 percent less likely to support the local when the opponent holds a passport from China—but 30 percent more likely to support the local when the opponent is a non-ethnic Chinese Southeast Asian athlete.

These results suggest affinity is one possible mechanism for why the Taiwanese are more likely to be integrated than the migrants from China. There is also a second mechanism: efficiency. When two individuals are able to interact repeatedly and regularly, this allows information to flow unencumbered. This information could be a set of simple facts (e.g., “Today is hotter than yesterday”). The information also could convey messages with cultural nuances (e.g., “I am hot” versus “It is hot to me”). Note that the former statement in Hungarian is not about the temperature but rather conveys that the speaker is gay! When two individuals speak the same language, they are able to interact efficiently. It is possible that this efficiency is what permits migrants

Table 5. Affinity for the Locals:  
Taiwanese versus Migrants from China

1=Support Local Athlete	Ethnic Chinese PRC National	Ethnic Chinese SE Asian National	Non-Chinese SE Asian National
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Taiwanese	1.742 (0.360) <sup>‡</sup>	1.487 (0.656) <sup>†</sup>	1.154 (0.608) <sup>*</sup>
Age	0.011 (0.008)	0.029 (0.006) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.003 (0.004)
Female	-0.182 (0.138)	-0.066 (0.100)	-0.194 (0.100) <sup>*</sup>
Time in Country	0.061 (0.012) <sup>‡</sup>	0.038 (0.010) <sup>‡</sup>	0.025 (0.010) <sup>†</sup>
Upper-Middle Class	-0.454 (0.145) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.080 (0.103)	0.251 (0.107) <sup>†</sup>
Portugal	-0.160 (0.206)	0.436 (0.144) <sup>‡</sup>	0.006 (0.138)
Constant	-2.764 (0.301) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.690 (0.189) <sup>‡</sup>	1.046 (0.155) <sup>‡</sup>
N	1929	2239	2212
Wald $\chi^2$	97.32 <sup>‡</sup>	20.04 <sup>‡</sup>	80.16 <sup>‡</sup>
Log Likelihood	-1165.571	-1208.858	-1324.946

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. <sup>\*</sup>  $p \leq 0.100$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ , and <sup>‡</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ .

<sup>54</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).

to better understand the locals, thereby facilitating integration. To test for this, the research considered whether the respondent had studied the local language. Of course, having studied the language is not indicative of proficiency. And likewise, it is possible for individuals to be proficient in a foreign language without formal studies. But overall, study of the language should be correlated with the respondent's baseline ability in the local language. In addition, the research considered whether the respondent interacted regularly with the same set of locals. Repeated interaction not only would provide opportunity to become more proficient in the local language, but also it would build trust. Given this discussion, one should expect the following predictions:

Prediction 2.1: The Taiwanese are more likely than the migrants from China to have studied the local language.

Prediction 2.2: The Taiwanese are more likely than the migrants from China to have regular contact with the same set of locals.

Figure 3 calls attention to major differences between the Taiwanese and migrants from China. We see a twenty percentage-point differential on both measures (i.e., having studied the local language and having interaction daily with the same set of locals). Consistent with our theoretical expectations, the Taiwanese are the migrants with the higher numbers. When we take into consideration demographic and regional controls, the results remain unchanged (see table 6). The average Taiwanese respondent is three times more likely than someone from China to have studied the local language ( $\beta=1.072$ ;  $SE=0.520$ ); also Taiwanese are six times more likely to interact with the same set of locals on a daily basis ( $\beta=1.848$ ;  $SE=0.745$ ). Of course, these measures are self-reported; there is no way to gauge the respondent's actual proficiency. Also, one does not know the extent of this contact: whether it is with food delivery personnel, a next-door neighbor, a child's homeroom teacher, or a spouse. Obviously, repeated contact with a local neighbor is very different from contact with a spouse. But, all else being equal, the fact that the respondents from Taiwan and China have the same opportunity to over- (or under-) report their linguistic proficiency and the nature of their social interactions makes bias less of a concern.

Also, in table 6, one sees that the control variables have a more substantive effect. Older respondents are 2 percent less likely to study the local language—an association that is not necessarily shocking. And, while women are 20 percent more likely than men to have studied the local language, they also are 20 percent less likely than their male counterparts to interact with the same set of locals on a regular basis. In addition, the positive effects of duration are not surprising, although the magnitude in both models is quite small (each

Figure 3. Extent of Interaction with Locals (% Affirmative)




Table 6. Efficiency with the Locals:  
Taiwanese versus Migrants from China

	Studied Local Language (1)	Daily Contact with Locals (2)
Taiwanese	1.072 (0.520) <sup>†</sup>	1.848(0.745) <sup>†</sup>
Age	-0.016 (0.004) <sup>‡</sup>	0.011 (0.007)
Female	0.163 (0.095) <sup>*</sup>	-0.191 (0.096) <sup>†</sup>
Time in Country	0.033 (0.009) <sup>‡</sup>	0.045 (0.010) <sup>‡</sup>
Upper-Middle Class	0.544 (0.101) <sup>‡</sup>	0.022 (0.100)
Portugal	-0.613 (0.124) <sup>‡</sup>	0.054 (0.136)
Constant	0.924 (0.159) <sup>‡</sup>	0.197 (0.245)
N	2212	2195
Wald $\chi^2$	80.16 <sup>‡</sup>	62.28 <sup>‡</sup>
Log Likelihood	-1324.946	-1279.203

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. \*  $p \leq 0.100$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ , and <sup>‡</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ .

additional year increases the likelihood by up to one percentage point). In contrast, wealth has a pronounced effect in model 1. Wealthier respondents are almost 75 percent more likely than respondents of more modest income to have studied the local language. This could be capturing the available means to formally study, as opposed to the desire to study, the language, per se. Interestingly, respondents in Portugal—while they do not have fewer interactions with the locals than their counterparts in Central-Eastern Europe ( $\beta=0.197$ ;  $SE=0.245$ )—are significantly less likely to have studied Portuguese ( $\beta=0.924$ ;  $SE=0.159$ ).

### *Disaggregating the Migrants from China*

Taken altogether, the results in table 3 suggest that Taiwanese migrants are more likely than the migrants from China to be integrated—along a variety of measures. To be fair, not all migrants from China are the same. Most importantly for this essay, there is heterogeneity in their province of origin. Migrants from Zhejiang—specifically Wenzhou—tend to be insular. The density of their network means the average Zhejiang migrant has little incentive to engage with anyone in the out-group. For them, the out-group is large. In contrast, non-Zhejiang migrants are forced to interact frequently and regularly with other migrants who, despite being Chinese, may not be from their hometown. From Anhui to Xinjiang, from Beijing to Yunnan, these migrants must interact in Mandarin (i.e., *putonghua*). Even when there are non-Chinese locals embedded in the network, they communicate in Mandarin. This diversity in contact means more opportunity for integration.

To consider the diversity in integration, the study divided the migrants from China into two network types. Specifically, the research identified whether respondents spoke Mandarin or a vernacular that is mutually unintelligible with Mandarin. This information was then checked against the respondent's area of origin—whether it was the province or the village. In most instances, the respondents were from the south. However, just because a respondent came from an area with a unique vernacular did not mean that one's migrant network was automatically insular. Migrant networks require a critical mass—here defined as more than 15 percent.<sup>55</sup> The same battery of regressions from table 3 were rerun, except this time, the reference category was not the aggregate “migrants from China” but rather “non-Zhejiang migrants.” The categorical dummy variable for Taiwan remained unchanged. The results are found in table 7.

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<sup>55</sup> Drude Dahlerup, “The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass,” *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 4 (2006): 511-522; Richard E. Matland and Donley T. Studlar, “The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway,” *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 3 (1996): 707-733; and Sue Thomas, “The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies,” *Journal of Politics* 53, no. 4 (1991): 958-976.

Table 7. Explaining Integration:  
Taiwanese versus Migrants from China Disaggregated

	If Robbed: Report Robbery	Discrimination @ Immigration	Locals are Trustworthy	Would Help a Lost Local
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Taiwanese	1.554 (0.739) <sup>†</sup>	-1.418 (0.521) <sup>‡</sup>	1.281 (0.705) <sup>*</sup>	1.928 (0.727) <sup>‡</sup>
Zhejiangese	-0.631 (0.186) <sup>‡</sup>	0.331 (0.179) <sup>*</sup>	-0.441 (0.205) <sup>†</sup>	-0.252 (0.186)
Age	0.004 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.004) <sup>‡</sup>	0.011 (0.006) <sup>*</sup>	0.001 (0.004)
Female	0.129 (0.102)	-0.171 (0.093) <sup>*</sup>	0.061 (0.110)	0.130 (0.093)
Time in Country	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.059 (0.009) <sup>‡</sup>
Upper-Middle Class	0.306 (0.109) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.449 (0.099) <sup>‡</sup>	-0.277 (0.113) <sup>†</sup>	-0.016 (0.097)
Portugal	-0.043 (0.143)	-0.310 (0.133) <sup>†</sup>	-0.306 (0.145) <sup>†</sup>	0.449 (0.135) <sup>‡</sup>
Constant	0.940 (0.238) <sup>‡</sup>	0.126 (0.160)	1.303 (0.212) <sup>‡</sup>	0.041 (0.151)
N	2215	2221	2225	2218
Wald $\chi^2$	26.12 <sup>‡</sup>	58.94 <sup>‡</sup>	24.88 <sup>‡</sup>	83.59 <sup>‡</sup>
Log Likelihood	-1187.345	-1365.764	-1046.615	-1366.340

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. \*  $p \leq 0.100$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ , and <sup>‡</sup>  $p \leq 0.050$ .

The results are telling. We see that the Taiwanese respondents are generally predisposed to higher levels of integration. For example, when it comes to trusting the authorities, they are nearly five times more likely than a non-Zhejiang migrant to voluntarily go to the police to report a robbery ( $\beta=1.554$ ;  $SE=0.739$ ). When it comes to their experiences at the immigration office, they are significantly less likely to recall having faced discrimination of any kind ( $\beta=-1.418$ ;  $SE=0.521$ ), while in contrast, non-Zhejiang migrants are four times more likely to say that they have. When it comes to interacting with the locals, the Taiwanese are almost four times more likely to find them trustworthy ( $\beta=1.281$ ;  $SE=0.705$ ) and almost seven times more likely to help a local who is lost ( $\beta=1.928$ ;  $SE=0.727$ ). Altogether, it seems that even when migrants from China are disaggregated into different types, the qualitative results remain unchanged. Specifically, Taiwanese respondents are much more likely to be integrated than those from China—thereby supporting hypothesis 2.

Yet, in table 4, one also can see important differences within the population of migrants from China. Those from Zhejiang are less likely to report a robbery ( $\beta=1.944$ ;  $SE=0.727$ ). In fact, compared to other migrants from China, they are half as likely to go to the police. Likewise, when it comes



to getting their residency permits, Zhejiang respondents are 40 percent more likely to recall having experienced discrimination by immigration officers ( $\beta=0.331$ ;  $SE=0.179$ ). Additionally, they are 65 percent less likely to find the locals trustworthy ( $\beta=-0.441$ ;  $SE=0.205$ ). The one measure where we see no significant difference between the two types of Chinese migrants is whether they would help a local who is lost—although interestingly, the coefficient is still signed in the predicted direction ( $\beta=-0.252$ ;  $SE=0.186$ ). These results suggest that migrants from Zhejiang are less likely to be integrated than the other migrants from China. This is in spite their home province being culturally and geographically proximate to Taiwan—suggesting this is not a southern China versus northern China differentiation. Instead, integration levels are lower among the Zhejiang migrants because they are situated in bonding networks, making it less likely that they have shared affinity or repeated interaction with the locals.

## Conclusion

This essay has examined the integration of the Taiwanese migrants in Europe by situating their experiences against those from China. This comparison revealed significant differences. Using original survey data, the research found that Taiwanese migrants are consistently more likely to trust the authorities in the host community and report positive experiences in the ongoing interaction; they are also more inclined to trust and help the locals. There are two possible reasons. One is that the Taiwanese are more likely to share similar values with the Europeans—ones based on multicultural liberalism. Another cause is that the Taiwanese—because they do not have the same density of migrant networks as the migrants from China—are more inclined to interact regularly, repeatedly, and reliably with the locals.

Admittedly, the surveyed Taiwanese population is small; Taiwanese constitute only 1.5 percent of the entire surveyed sample. However, it is important to note that this figure is *higher* than that for the population. The numbers in table 1—official figures reported by Eurostat—reveal that the Taiwanese account for 1.4 percent of the ethnic Chinese population in Europe. There is another consideration: the surveys were administered mostly in ethnic Chinese-concentrated neighborhoods (i.e., “Chinatowns”). However, if we are to believe scholars such as Leung,<sup>56</sup> the Taiwanese tend to be engaged in high-skilled sectors, in areas that are not near Chinatowns. These individuals are more likely than migrants from China to be incorporated into society, given their job requirements (e.g., knowing English) and their educational attainment (e.g., vocational school or college). Because these individuals were not included in the survey, the observed statistical difference is an *underestimation* of the real one.

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<sup>56</sup> Leung. “Get IT Going.”

The above discrepancy highlights an important policy recommendation: When migrant communities are small—or at a minimum, when they are spread out—they are more inclined to develop interethnic bonds with other migrants from different backgrounds and with the locals. These bonds allow for repeated, regularized interaction; they also facilitate information flow. All of this is important for integration. In contrast, when a migrant community is large and concentrated, there is little incentive for the migrants to wander far beyond the comfort of their cultural and linguistic zone, which, without a doubt, impedes integration. Yet, we know from the literature that civic associations<sup>57</sup> and education<sup>58</sup> are important mechanisms for migrant engagement with the host country. To this end, if European governments—any government, in fact—are interested in the integration of their migrant communities, it is in their interest to facilitate such interethnic networks.

The results in this essay suggest three distinct avenues for future research. The first is to compare the Taiwanese to other ethnic Chinese groups. For example, Lien<sup>59</sup> frequently compares the Taiwanese to migrants from Hong Kong in the United States. Likewise, we can explore whether there is a similar pattern in Europe. Portugal, for example, is home to a large Macanese population. Alternatively, we can compare the Taiwanese to other small, but distinct, Asian populations that have traditionally valued political liberalism (e.g., migrants from South Korea). A second avenue of research is to shift the focus to the locals. The differences we see are from the perspective of the ethnic Chinese; there is no guarantee that the locals see the same distinctions. It would be a fruitful avenue of research to see whether the locals hold different opinions about the two communities—and if so, whether they can identify the differences. A third avenue of research is to examine when the Taiwanese identify with the migrants from China. The author finds<sup>60</sup> that, in times of a policy shock, interethnic networks break down; there is more finger-pointing and a decline in trust. Likewise, when there is a crisis (e.g., the coronavirus) do the Taiwanese double-down to differentiate themselves from the migrants from China, or do they feel attacked and ally with them?

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<sup>57</sup> Putnam, *Bowling Alone*.

<sup>58</sup> Lien, “Comparing Political Socialization in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.”

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. See also, Lien, “Transnational Homeland Concerns and Participation in U.S. Politics,” and id., “Chinese American Attitudes towards Homeland Government and Politics.”

<sup>60</sup> Liu, *The Language of Political Incorporation*.